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ARTICLE
OBSTRUCTING THE BERNARDO INVESTIGATION: KENNETH MURRAY
AND THE DEFENCE COUNSEL‟S CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS TO
CLIENTS AND THE COURT
Christopher D. Clemmer*

This article focuses on how the investigation and prosecution of Paul
Bernardo not only exposed one of Ontario‟s most notorious killers but led to
significant discussion about the legal and ethical obligations faced by
criminal defence lawyers. Using the example of the prosecution of Kenneth
Murray, Bernardo‟s lawyer, for obstruction of justice, this paper examines the
tension that is created between the conflicting duties owed by defence
lawyers to candor and confidentiality. The limits of confidentiality are
explored, as is the importance of the solicitor-client relationship to the legal
system and whether (or when) there is a duty to disclose the possession of
physical evidence. This paper will ultimately demonstrate that the ethical
obligations faced by criminal defence counsel are often highly contextual and
can only be decided on a case-by-case basis. As such, it is important that
lawyers are provided with adequate guidance on difficult ethical and legal
situations. However, despite Murray‟s prosecution (and acquittal), defence
lawyers could still benefit from greater guidance in these difficult and
legally-significant situations.
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I
INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 1991, the dismembered body of 14-year-old Leslie
Mahaffy was found encased in concrete in a lake near St. Catharines,
Ontario. Abducted two weeks earlier, she had been raped before
being murdered.1 Less than one year later, the naked body of 15-yearold Kristen French was found in a ditch in Burlington, Ontario,
having suffered the same fate.2 The investigations that followed not
only exposed one of Canada‟s most notorious killer couples, but
eventually thrust Ontario‟s legal community into a divisive argument
about the ethical and legal obligations of criminal defence lawyers.
Kenneth Murray, defence counsel for accused killer Paul Bernardo,
was eventually charged with obstruction of justice for his handling of
1

Report to the Attorney General of Ontario on Certain Matters Relating to Karla
Homolka by Patrick T. Galligan (Toronto: ADR Chambers, 1996) at 230 [Galligan

2

Ibid.

Report].
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inculpatory physical evidence while representing his client.3 This
paper will examine Murray‟s conduct during his representation of
Bernardo and will discuss the balance that must be struck by a
criminal defence lawyer when she is faced with the prospect of
accepting physical evidence from her client. It will then be
demonstrated that the ethical obligations faced by criminal defence
counsel are often highly contextual and can only be decided on a caseby-case basis.
To understand Murray‟s actions, it is important to have a
general understanding of the crimes with which Bernardo had been
charged, as well as timeline of the case. Accordingly, this paper will
begin with an account of the crimes of Bernardo and his former wife
and accomplice Karla Homolka. Essential to this chronology are the
dates on which Murray viewed the contents of six videotapes
depicting the rapes and tortures of the eventual murder victims (“the
tapes”), the date on which Homolka struck her plea bargain with the
Crown, and the length of time that the tapes were held in Murray‟s
possession. This timeline will assist in an examination of Murray‟s
conduct, his subsequent prosecution, and the Law Society of Upper
Canada (“LSUC”) investigation.
Following a summary of the pertinent facts, the obstruction of
justice charge will be evaluated. The charge will be defined and it will
be demonstrated that Murray‟s actions satisfy the actus reus of the
offense. The importance of the videotapes will then be examined and
their tactical value outlined. It will become clear that Murray did, in
fact, have legitimate justification for withholding the tapes. Mr.
Justice Gravely‟s reasons for Murray‟s acquittal on the charge of
obstruction of justice will be outlined, as will the LSUC‟s decision to
drop its investigation of the professional misconduct allegations.
Finally, the rationale behind Murray‟s decision to remove himself
from the Bernardo case will be outlined. It will ultimately be
demonstrated that Murray‟s possession of the tapes put him in an
extremely difficult ethical and legal position.
Subsequent to an examination of the obstruction of justice
allegations, this paper will evaluate the obligations that a criminal
defence lawyer has to her client. Once a lawyer has been retained
3

R. v. Murray (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 544 (Sup. Ct.), 186 D.L.R. (4th) 125 [Murray cited
to O.R.].
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there is a duty upon that lawyer to represent her client with
undivided loyalty, within the constraints of the law. This paper will
also demonstrate that this duty includes an inherent obligation to
avoid judging a client‟s guilt. The duty to observe the instructions of
the client will then be examined. Ultimately, it will be demonstrated
that once retained, the criminal defence lawyer must zealously
represent the interests of her client, subject to few qualifications.
Furthermore, this analysis will demonstrate that a criminal
defence lawyer is bound by an obligation to further the course of
justice as she defends her client, which prohibits the use of tactics that
have the effect of misleading the court, explicitly or implicitly. This
duty to the administration of justice can also restrict solicitor-client
privilege. The lawyer‟s duty to the administration of justice creates an
obligation that defines the limits of her duty to her client, but that
often seems to conflict with that duty.
Subsequently, the most fundamental elements of the
relationship between a criminal defence lawyer and her client –
solicitor-client privilege and the duty to confidentiality – will be
examined. The privilege that attaches to most lawyer-client
discussions results in an obligation on the part of the lawyer to keep in
the strictest of confidences almost anything that has been said
between her and her client. This obligation prohibits criminal defence
lawyers from assisting the Crown‟s case against her client.4 Privilege
does, however, have limits. For example, the lawyer‟s obligation to
strict confidentiality does not oblige her to commit or be a party to a
criminal offense (such as obstructing justice). Moreover, it will be
shown that some communications have been found to be outside of
the scope of solicitor-client privilege and the duty to confidentiality.
Finally, this paper will examine the question of whether privilege can
extend to physical evidence or whether there is a duty to disclose such
evidence.
Maintaining the integrity of Canada‟s legal system requires a
delicate balance between the rights of the accused and the rights of
society. Using this as a foundation for analysis, this paper will examine
the importance of respecting the basic rights of the accused in a
criminal proceeding. It is essential that the accused be fully-informed
4

The Crown, however, must fully disclose its case. See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3
S.C.R. 326, 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1.
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of his rights to defence, which requires largely uninhibited discussion
with their lawyer. Without absolute trust in confidentiality, it is
likely that the client will not disclose information that is essential to
his defence. Additionally, this initial disclosure by the client may
require the lawyer to take possession of inculpatory evidence.
Therefore, a lack of trust between the lawyer and client will serve to
deny the accused of his right to a full defence. Ultimately, it is
difficult to maintain the integrity of the criminal system if a defence
lawyer is compelled to break client confidentiality by disclosing
physical evidence to the authorities even if that is the state of the law
at present.
Much of the controversy surrounding a criminal defence
lawyer‟s possession of physical evidence relates to whether (or when)
there is a duty of disclosure. This analysis will discuss when this duty
exists and will argue that in virtually all situations, a defence lawyer
does not have an obligation to assist an investigation against her
client. There is disagreement about a lawyer‟s obligations when she
comes into possession of inculpatory physical evidence. There seems
to be a right to withhold physical evidence for a reasonable period of
time but there is little guidance on this issue, at least from the LSUC.
As a result, the expectations of criminal defence lawyers in possession
of inculpatory physical evidence are unclear, although the existing
jurisprudence can be of assistance in that respect.
Having examined a lawyer‟s obligations both to her client and
the administration of justice, this paper will then examine the tension
created by these conflicting duties. The fact that a criminal defence
lawyer is pulled in opposite directions by these duties can make her
job very difficult. As such, under incredible pressure and with little
guidance relating to the expectations of defence lawyers, Murray had
to find a balance. This paper will argue his decision to retain the tapes
was not entirely unreasonable.
As a criminal defence lawyer tries to satisfy her competing
obligations, guidance from the LSUC is essential. This analysis will
discuss the importance of guidance on the part of the LSUC in
maintaining public confidence in the legal profession. Murray‟s
dilemma was largely the result of the lack of guidance on difficult
ethical issues from the LSUC, although, admittedly, this problem
could have been mitigated through a review of the existing
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jurisprudence relating to the retention of physical evidence.5
Nevertheless, the rules of the LSUC themselves provided little
guidance. In the absence of specific professional guidelines, it is
important for individual lawyers to develop personal ethical codes of
conduct and review the existing jurisprudence relating to the matter
at issue. Guiding principles from the LSUC, complemented by
personal codes, will help to establish a baseline from which defence
lawyers may work. Lawyers need guidance as they face the conflict
between duties to the client and to the administration of justice.
As a result of the Murray case, the options left to defence
lawyers in possession of inculpatory physical evidence have been
significantly limited. This analysis will outline the options provided to
lawyers in possession of inculpatory physical evidence by Mr. Justice
Gravely in the Murray decision, which have established a duty to
disclose and a duty to inform the client of mandated disclosure. The
LSUC‟s reaction to the Murray decision will then be outlined. The
need for a revised rule will be established and the LSUC‟s proposed
rule will be discussed.6
This paper will conclude with an examination of the present
day LSUC Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Rules”) relevant to the
issues Murray faced. Despite several revisions, the Rules remain
ambiguous and provide little guidance for criminal defence lawyers
facing those same issues. Despite the good intentions behind the
LSUC‟s proposed rule, criminal defence lawyers are offered little help.
There is an obvious need to prevent obstruction of justice by
lawyers. If everything placed in a lawyer‟s hands was protected,
lawyers‟ offices would become evidence safe houses. Conversely, by
compelling some types of evidence to be disclosed, the fear that it will
be disclosed to the Crown is likely to result in the accused being
denied the opportunity to present to his lawyer evidence that is
potentially relevant to his defence. This would force an accused
person to decide what is important to show his lawyer and, as a result,
would deny him a full, competent legal opinion. In this respect, laws
compelling the defence to produce physical evidence arguably do so at
the expense of the accused. Murray highlighted this tension. At the
5
6

See Murray, supra note 3 at paras. 80, 149.
As will be seen, due to widespread opposition, the proposed rule was never adopted.
As a result, defence lawyers are again left with very little guidance from the LSUC.
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time, the only realistic guidance was from case law relating to the
production of physical evidence and not from the Rules. Without
adequate guidance and facing competing duties, lawyers are left on
their own to make difficult and significant ethical decisions.
II
THE CHRONOLOGICAL CONTEXT
To fully appreciate Murray‟s dilemma, it is essential to
understand the crimes perpetrated by Paul Bernardo. This section of
the paper will survey the relevant elements of Bernardo‟s crimes in an
attempt to demonstrate the incredibly difficult circumstances in
which Murray found himself.
On December 24, 1990, an unconscious Tammy Homolka
choked to death on her own vomit.7 Tammy had been drugged with
animal tranquilizers by Paul Bernardo and Karla Homolka, her older
sister, so that she could be raped while unconscious.8 Although her
death was ruled accidental, the string of deaths attributable to
Bernardo had begun. Six months later, on June 15, 1991, 14-year-old
Leslie Mahaffy went missing from outside of her Burlington, Ontario
home. Mahaffy‟s dismembered body was found set in concrete on
June 29, 1991.9 She had been kidnapped, raped, tortured, and
murdered by Bernardo and Homolka. On April 16, 1992, 15-year-old
Kristen French went missing from a church parking lot in St.
Catharines, Ontario.10 Two weeks later, her naked body was found in
a ditch in Burlington. French had suffered the same fate as Mahaffy:
she was abducted, raped, tortured, and murdered by Bernardo and
Homolka. The rapes and tortures of Tammy Homolka, Kristen French,
Leslie Mahaffy, and at least two other young women were captured

7

R. v. Bernardo (20 June 1995), Toronto Region (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (Evidence,

8

Ibid. at 175-180.

9

Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 230.
Ibid. See also Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “In-Depth: Bernardo,
Bernardo/Homolka Timeline” CBC News In-Depth (21 February 2006), online:
CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/bernardo/> [CBC].

testimony of Karla Homolka Vol. 1 at 165-166).

10
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on six home videotapes. However, the murders of Mahaffy and
French do not seem to have been filmed.11
In mid-February 1993, after a three year investigation,
Bernardo was arrested in relation to a string of violent rapes that took
place in Scarborough, east of Toronto.12 Kenneth Murray, a criminal
defence lawyer from Newmarket, was retained by Bernardo to defend
these charges.13 On February 19, police executed a search warrant of
Bernardo and Homolka‟s St. Catharines home which, despite lasting
for 71-days, failed to produce the tapes.14 On May 6, after the
expiration of the warrant, Murray, Carolyn MacDonald (co-counsel),
and Kim Doyle (office manager and law clerk) were given
unsupervised access to the home by Bernardo‟s landlord to retrieve his
personal belongings.15 While in the home, Bernardo gave Murray
specific instructions (over a cellular telephone) as to the location of
the tapes, which were above a ceiling light fixture in an upstairs
bathroom.16 Bernardo instructed that although they would view the
tapes in the future, Murray was not to view them. Murray would keep
the tapes for 17 months.17
On May 14, Homolka, a suspect in the murders of French and
Mahaffy, agreed to a plea bargain in exchange for her testimony
against Bernardo.18 The Crown had very little evidence to use in
Bernardo‟s murder prosecution; Homolka‟s testimony was essential.19

Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 230; French Estate v. Ontario (Attorney General)
[1996] O.J. No. 1300 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 587 at para. 2 (cited to O.J.)
12 CBC, supra note 10; Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 233.
13Murray, supra note 3 at paras. 1, 4-5.
14 Ibid. at para. 6.
15 Murray, supra note 3 at para. 6.
16 Ibid. at para. 10.
17 Ibid. at para. 85a.
18 The negotiations leading up to the agreement began on February 12, 1993 and
lasted for three months. See Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 52. For a copy of the
plea arrangement between Crown Attorney Murray Segal and Defence Lawyer
George Walker, see Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 240-246.
19 In his Report on Homolka‟s plea agreement, Justice Galligan claimed that “by the
end of April [1993], the case against Paul Bernardo had not advanced at all. None of
[the DNA] evidence was by then available. The videotapes had not been found. The
search warrants expired on April 30, 1993 and all of the inquiries and investigations
had not led the police a step closer to Paul Bernardo. The only way to him was
through Karla Homolka…The authorities were faced with the unpleasant fact that
11
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As a result, she was offered an extremely attractive plea bargain:
instead of two counts of first-degree murder, she would plead guilty to
two counts of manslaughter, resulting in a 12-year sentence.20
Sometime during May 14-17, Murray learned about Homolka‟s
completed plea bargain (although no details about the terms). On May
18, the day that Bernardo was charged with the first-degree murders
of French and Homolka, Bernardo authorized Murray to watch the
tapes.21 Sometime later in the month, he rented copying equipment
and duplicated the tapes, but did not bill the Ontario Legal Aid Plan,
concerned that this would alert the prosecution to the existence of the
tapes.22 On July 6, with the tapes still safely in Murray‟s possession,
Homolka pled guilty to two counts of manslaughter, and was
sentenced to a 12-year prison term. The details of her plea
arrangement and her statement of facts were restricted by a courtordered publication ban.23 The plea bargain was completed and the
tapes remained a secret.
In August 1994, Murray, for various reasons, asked defence
lawyer John Rosen to take over the Bernardo case, to which Rosen
hesitantly agreed.24 On September 2, through lawyer Austin Cooper,
Murray wrote to the LSUC to ask for advice on what to do with the
tapes.25 The LSUC‟s September 8 response, signed by the ad hoc
committee of Earl Levy Q.C., Paul Copeland, and Colin Campbell
Q.C., instructed that the tapes be turned over to the trial judge,
Murray be removed from the case, and Bernardo be immediately
notified.26 Although the tapes were passed over to Rosen on
September 12, he was uncomfortable with the prospect of
surrendering the tapes before being able to evaluate them and
ascertain their significance. That day, Murray was removed as counsel
and LeSage A.C.J.O.C. ruled that Rosen was allowed to retain the
tapes until October 7, with the understanding that he would “deal
if Paul Bernardo was to be prosecuted for those offenses, it was essential that they
have Karla Homolka‟s evidence and co-operation.” [emphasis added]. Ibid. at 76.
20 Murray, supra note 3 at para. 15.
21 Ibid. at para. 16.
22 Ibid. at para. 29.
23 R. v. Bernardo [1994] O.J. No. 4119 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div)) at paras. 7, 9, 12; Galligan
Report, supra note 1 at 101.
24 Murray, supra note 3 at paras. 50-54.
25 Ibid. at para. 2.
26 Ibid. at para. 70.
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ethically, legally and professionally with [them] and would preserve
[their] integrity.”27 Although in Rosen‟s subsequent meetings with the
Crown he maintained that he had no ethical or legal obligation to
surrender the tapes, Bernardo instructed that the tapes be turned over
to the Crown.28 On September 22, the tapes were delivered to
representatives of the Metropolitan Toronto Police and the Niagara
Regional Police.29
Bernardo was found guilty of all charges against him and was
sentenced to 25-years in prison on 1 September 1995.30 In January
1997, Kenneth Murray was charged with obstructing justice,
conspiracy to obstruct justice, possessing child pornography and
making obscene materials for withholding and copying the tapes.31
The latter two charges were later dropped by the Crown.32 Murray‟s
co-counsel, Carolyn MacDonald, was also charged with obstructing
justice and possession of child pornography, although the charges
against MacDonald were dropped in May 1997.33 In March 2000,
Murray unsuccessfully sought a stay of proceedings by claiming that
his “to a trial within a reasonable time as guaranteed by s. 11(b) of the
Charter has been infringed by both pre and post-charge delay”, the
latter delay lasted for 38-months.34
In February, the LSUC served Murray with professional
misconduct complaints, the hearing for which was delayed until after
his criminal trial.35 No complaint of professional misconduct was
made against MacDonald.36 On June 13, 2000, Murray was acquitted
of the criminal charges against him. Gravely J held that “Murray's
Ibid. at para. 74.
Ibid. at para. 82, 84.
29 Ibid. at para. 85.
30 Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 239; R. v. Bernardo (1995) Toronto (Ont. Ct. J.
27
28

(Gen. Div)).
31

R. v. Murray, [2000] O.J. No. 1365, 185 D.L.R. (4th) 746 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) at para.
3 [cited to O.J.]

Ibid. at Appendix A.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid. at paras. 1, 8.
32

The Law Society of Upper Canada (Professional Regulation Committee), Press
Release, “Charges of professional misconduct against Kenneth Murray withdrawn”
(29 November 2000), online: LSUC
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/nov2900Kennethmurray.pdf [LSUC Committee].
36 Beth Gorham, “Bernardo lawyer faces censure over graphic videotapes” The Calgary
Herald (22 February 1997) A15 [Gorham].
35
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testimony…raises a reasonable doubt as to his intention to obstruct
justice.”37 Similarly, on November 29, 2000, the LSUC withdrew the
charges of professional misconduct and Robert P. Armstrong Q.C.,
then the Treasurer of the LSUC, promised the appointment of a
special committee to “devise a proposed rule of professional conduct
to provide guidance to lawyers who may be faced with similar issues
in the future.”38 The proposed rule, which will subsequently be
examined, was not adopted by the LSUC. In December 2001, the tapes
depicting the torture and rape of Bernardo and Homolka‟s victims
were finally destroyed.39 Murray had escaped from the Bernardo
ordeal without any sanction.
Murray‟s conduct during the Bernardo case raised questions of
fundamental importance for criminal defence lawyers who take
possession of incriminating physical evidence. The history of the
Murray ordeal demonstrates that Ontario‟s professional guidelines
relating to this issue were, and continue to be, woefully inadequate.
Unfortunately, despite the controversy brought on by the Murray
case, little has changed.
III
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
Obstruction of justice is an extremely serious offense. Canada‟s

Criminal Code outlines that “everyone who wilfully attempts…to
obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice is guilty of an
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding ten years.”40 This is the offense with which Kenneth
Murray was charged for his role in secreting away the inculpatory
tapes in the Bernardo case.41, As is clear from the jurisprudence
relating to the offence of obstructing justice42, to be convicted of
obstruction of justice, the accused must have done some act which

Murray, supra note 3 at para. 154.
LSUC Committee, supra note 35.
39 CBC, supra note 10.
40 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.139(2).
41 Murray, supra note 3 at para. 85a.
42 See e.g. R. v. May (1984), 13 C.C.C.(3d) 257 (Ont. C.A.) at 260, R. v. Kirkham
(1998), 126 C.C.C.(3d) 397 at 411 (Sask. Q.B.).
37
38
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tends to pervert the course of justice, with the specific intention of
perverting the course of justice.43
Although it may be necessary for a criminal defence lawyer to
take possession of physical evidence to defend her client, according to
University of Victoria Law Professor David Layton and defence
lawyer Michel Proulx, it would be an offense for a defence lawyer
“even temporarily to remove evidence of a crime for the purposes of
preventing seizure by the police.”44 Similarly, Layton and Proulx add
that the defence cannot “actively impede a police investigation.”45
Neither ethical considerations nor solicitor-client privilege could ever
permit a lawyer to break the law or be a party to the law being broken
in this manner.46 Clearly, criminal defence lawyers must carefully
consider conduct that runs the risk of obstructing the course of
justice.
Murray‟s conduct obstructed the course of justice as it related
to Homolka.47 Shortly after Murray came into possession of the tapes,
Homolka entered into a plea bargain with the Crown which, until
then, had very little evidence against Bernardo.48 The consensus
amongst those who thought that Murray had done wrong was that
had the prosecution been in possession of the tapes, the need for
Homolka‟s testimony against Bernardo would have been greatly
diminished. As a result, Homolka‟s extremely lenient plea bargain
would never have been offered.49 According to the Honourable
Patrick Galligan, who conducted the official inquiry into Homolka‟s
plea bargain, “if the videotapes had been in the hands of the
authorities on or before May 14, 1993, the Crown would never have

Lucinda Vandervort, “Mistake of Law and Obstruction of Justice: A „Bad
Excuse‟…Even For a Lawyer” (2001) 50 U.N.B.L.J. 171 at 174 [Vandervort].
44 David Layton and Michel Proulx, Ethics and Canadian Criminal Law (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2001) at 495 [Layton].
45 Ibid. at 490.
46 Earl A. Cherniak, “Ethics of Advocacy” (1985) 19 L. Soc‟y Gaz. 147 at 147
[Cherniak].
47 In his trial, it was found that Murray‟s conduct had satisfied the actus reus of the
offense of obstructing justice. Murray, supra note 3 at para. 100.
48 Anothony DePalma, “Murderer‟s Sex Tapes Put Canadian Lawyer at Risk” The New
York Times (27 February 1997) A4 [DePalma].
49 Peter M. Brauti & Gena Argitis, “Possession of Evidence by Counsel: Ontario‟s
Proposed Solution” (2003) 47 Crim. L.Q. 211 at 219 [Brauti].
43
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entered into the [plea] agreement with Karla Homolka.”50 He added
that after conducting extensive interviews, “all of the persons who
were involved told me that if the videotapes had been available at the
time, Karla Homolka would have found herself in the prisoner‟s box
beside Paul Bernardo.”51 Similarly, according to Dan Mahaffy, Leslie‟s
father, “had the tapes been turned over to the police, Karla wouldn‟t
have been able to plea bargain and she‟d be serving a first-degree
murder term with Bernardo.”52 Bernardo‟s lead prosecutor Ray
Houlahan echoed this opinion.53 Interestingly, despite his apparent
centrality to Homolka‟s plea arrangement, Kenneth Murray was not
interviewed during the nearly four-month inquiry conducted by the
Honourable Patrick Galligan.54
In Murray‟s trial, Gravely J held that “the tapes were the
products and instrumentalities of crime and were far more potent
„hard evidence‟ than the often-mentioned „smoking gun‟ and „bloody
shirt.‟” Their concealment, he added, “had the potential to infect all
aspects of the criminal justice system.”55 Had Murray not secreted the
tapes, Homolka would have been charged with two counts of firstdegree murder, not the two counts of manslaughter to which she pled
guilty. The implication, according to Assistant Crown Attorney
50

Ibid.

Galligan Report, supra note 1 at 89. Galligan claimed that “in addition to providing
extensive detail about the matters under investigation, Karla Homolka gave the
police a vital piece of information. Until that time, the police had no evidence
other than Karla Homolka directly connecting Paul Bernardo to either Leslie
Mahaffy or Kristen French. During the course of the induced interview, Karla
Homolka provided the police with some information which enabled the police to
make a direct link between Paul Bernardo and the dead body of Leslie Mahaffy.”
Moreover, he adds: “It is my firm conclusion that, distasteful as it always is to
negotiate with an accomplice, the Crown had no alternative but to do so in this
case…It is, as Dan Mahaffy put it, the „lesser of two evils‟ to deal with an
accomplice rather than to be left in a situation where a violent and dangerous
offender cannot be prosecuted…The public interest demanded that Paul Bernardo
be prosecuted for murder. I do not see how it could have been responsible to delay
the institution of that prosecution to some uncertain time in the future on the hope
that some evidence might turn up which would make Karla Homolka‟s testimony
unnecessary.” Ibid. at 94, 111.
52 Gorham, supra note 36.
53 Alan Cairns & Scott Burnside, “Ken Murray‟s tale of the tapes” Law Times (23
October 1995) 1 [Cairns].
54 See Galligan Report, supra note 1 at Appendix A.
55 Murray, supra note 3 at paras. 109, 111.
51
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Matthew Humphreys, is that when you discover the evidence and you
are blind to its contents, you have an obligation to make the evidence
known.56 Murray, having failed in this obligation, had obstructed the
course of justice.
Criminally charging a defence lawyer with obstruction of
justice for withholding evidence is an uncommon reaction. According
to Austin Cooper, Murray‟s counsel, there has never been a successful
criminal prosecution of a defence lawyer for holding onto physical
evidence.57 University of Ottawa Law Professor David Paciocco had
also never heard of such a prosecution, adding that “it‟s extremely
unusual for the Criminal Code to be used against the [defence]
counsel for attempting to defend their clients.”58 However, despite its
unconventionality, obstruction of justice charges proceeded against
Murray.

A. THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE TAPES
According to Murray‟s testimony, the tapes formed an
essential part of Bernardo‟s defence and his strategy required their
concealment.59 When the tapes were discovered, it was thought that
they were a “„bonanza‟ or „gold mine‟” for the defence.60 Murray
immediately made a pact with Doyle and MacDonald, swearing them
to secrecy.61 According to Murray, the tapes had tremendous tactical
value, who claimed that the Crown was going to portray Homolka as
“a shrinking, abused wife under the control of Bernardo” – merely a
“manipulated victim.”62 The benefit of the tapes to the defence,
however, “was not just that Homolka could be shown as a liar, but
also as a person capable of committing murder.”63 One tape shows
Interview of Matthew Humphreys, Assistant Crown Attorney, Ministry of the
Attorney General, County of Ottawa-Carleton (1 November 2007) [“Humphreys
Interview”].
57 Kirk Makin & Theresa Ebden, “Bernardo lawyer a scapegoat: counsel” The Globe
and Mail (10 May 2000) A7 [Makin, “Bernardo Lawyer”].
58 Stephen Bindman, “Charging defence counsel unusual, legal experts say” The
Vancouver Sun (24 January 1997) A18.
59 Murray, supra note 3 at para. 127.
60 Ibid. at para. 11.
61 Ibid. at paras. 11, 34.
62 Ibid. at para. 26.
63 Ibid. at para. 138.
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Homolka administering tranquilizers to her sister and another girl,
then participating in the sexual assaults on both of them, while others
show her involvement in the rape and torture of Mahaffy and French.
The tapes did not show a cowering, fearful Homolka, but an
enthusiastic participant in the sexual assaults.64 At Murray‟s trial,
Cooper said the tapes gave Bernardo a slim chance. Although making
Bernardo look bad, the tapes also made Homolka look equally bad.65
Bernardo had admitted to the sex-related crimes but had denied
killing Mahaffy or French and the tapes supported such a theory as a
possibility. Ultimately, as Gravely J held in the trial, “Murray's alleged
plan to use the tapes… is not unfeasible.”66
The tactical value of the tapes, however, would have been
greatly diminished if the Crown were to have been given the
opportunity to prepare Homolka for cross-examination.67 Murray
claimed that the tapes would be used either after the preliminary trial,
in an attempt to negotiate a plea bargain for Bernardo, or at trial to
undermine the credibility of the Crown‟s star witness (Homolka) and
introduce doubt as to who had murdered Mahaffy and French.68 Both
uses required that the prosecution be surprised with the tapes at trial.
If the tapes could be used to undermine Homolka, it is reasonable to
believe that Murray could and should have used them in Bernardo‟s
defence.
Despite the potential benefit the tapes had for Bernardo‟s
defence, there is a real argument that Bernardo would have been
better served had the tapes never come out. Murray‟s admitted
strategy for employing the tapes was to introduce them to show how
bad they made Homolka look. Thus, it follows that the tapes would
serve to make Bernardo look equally bad – likely to his detriment
during a jury trial for a crime that had already seen one of the
perpetrators agree to a lenient plea bargain. As Gravely J identified
during Murray‟s trial, the tapes were “damning evidence” and quoted
Ibid.
Ibid.
66 Ibid. at para. 140.
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Rosen in holding that the any jury that viewed the tapes “would have
convicted him of sinking the Titanic.” Bernardo‟s case, Gravely J
added, “would have been in a substantially better position if the tapes
had never surfaced.”69
Kitchener, Ontario-based criminal defence lawyer Randall
Martin also had trouble understanding Murray‟s decision to introduce
the tapes in Bernardo‟s defence. “Why would he introduce those tapes
at all?” Martin asked, adding that “showing those films wouldn‟t
strengthen his case,” but rather “the tapes were certainly going to hurt
Bernardo‟s case.”70 Similarly, Gravely J held that the tapes “provide
strong circumstantial evidence to prove Bernardo guilty of the
murders.”71 University of British Columbia Associate Law Professor
Janine Benedet agrees, claiming that the tapes were “an evidentiary
record of the accused committing at least part of what he has been
charged with.”72 Introducing the tapes in Bernardo‟s defence,
therefore, was a risky proposition.
In a subsequent civil case by the estate of Kristen French
against the Ontario government, Moldaver J.A. claimed that in “the
Bernardo criminal trial, the videotapes played a central, if not crucial
role, in bringing Bernardo to justice. The tapes formed some of the
most cogent and damning evidence against Bernardo and their value
in his successful prosecution cannot be overstated.”73 Ultimately,
despite the fact that the use of the tapes was questionable, Murray‟s
belief that they could introduce reasonable doubt to the charges of
first degree murder helped establish his defence to the obstruction of
justice charge.
B. MURRAY‟S CASE FOR WITHHOLDING THE TAPES
At the time of his decision, it was possible that Murray had a
justifiable reason for withholding the tapes. Prior to and following the
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plea agreement, repeated requests for notes from Crown deal-maker
Murray Segal and Homolka‟s lawyer, George Walker, were ignored. It
was not until six months after the deal had been struck that Murray
was provided with some of the details of the plea arrangement.74 The
full details of the plea arrangement were not provided until disclosure
was ordered by the Ontario Court of Justice on May 10, 1994.75 At the
time of the plea negotiations, Murray had not watched the content of
the tapes.76 Had Murray been provided with the details of the plea
arrangement before the deal was completed, he would have been in a
better position to avoid the possibility of obstructing justice, perhaps
by requesting Bernardo‟s permission to view the tapes and then
turning them over if he deemed it necessary. Moreover, when the
deal was being negotiated, Murray believed that the Crown knew
about some of the tapes‟ contents. During their investigation, the
police had seized portions of the video from Bernardo‟s briefcase,
which showed Homolka willingly involved in sexual acts.77 As will be
subsequently discussed, Murray had a genuine belief that there was no
duty to turn the tapes over to the Crown.
As was stated by Cooper at the time of Murray‟s trial,
“anybody who thinks [defence] lawyers are supposed to further the
hunt for the truth in a criminal case is misled.”78 He added that
“lawyers may quite justifiably tear apart Crown witnesses, decline to
turn over material that harms their clients and force the Crown to
prove its case” and that defence lawyers are often required “to do
certain things that obstruct the course of justice and obstruct a
prosecution.”79 In a vernacular sense, Cooper seems to have been
indicating that defense lawyers often do things that do not assist the
Crown and that may impede fact-finding in an effort to build a full
defense for her client.
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C. ACQUITTAL AND PROFESSIONAL SANCTION
With little doubt that Murray‟s actions tended towards the
obstruction of justice, his fate with respect to the criminal trial hinged
on one word: wilfully. This word, held Gravely J, denotes a specific
intent offense and thus, the onus was on the Crown to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that Murray, in suppressing the tapes, intended to
obstruct justice.80 Gravely J did not find that the Crown had proven its
case. “The context of the whole of the evidence,” Gravely J held,
“raises a reasonable doubt as to his intention to obstruct justice.”81
Murray did not have the requisite mens rea for the offense and
therefore, had to be found not guilty of obstruction of justice. This
conclusion, however, was not well-received by some in the academic
community. Associate Professor Benedet, for example, commented
during an interview for this paper that Gravely J “fiddles with the
mens rea of the charge…and [he] kind of slides mistake of law and
mistake of fact together in a way that I don‟t find convincing.”82
Benedet, who thinks that Murray intended to suppress the tapes
permanently, felt that Gravely J did not want Murray to be the “fall
guy” for a systemic problem that was “bigger than Murray.”83 Despite
the dissent, Murray‟s belief that he was acting within the confines of
the law won out.
Murray‟s acquittal, however, did not signal the end of his
troubles. Murray still faced the threat of sanction by the LSUC, which
had served him with a professional misconduct complaint in February
1997.84 It was asserted that contrary to Rule 2.02(5), Murray has
become “the tool or dupe of his unscrupulous client”85 and that he
failed to look at the contents of the tapes to decide whether they
should have been disclosed to the police.86 Defence lawyer Randall
Martin explains that this was because he “allowed himself to be…used
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by his client.”87 The hearing for the claims was deferred until the
conclusion of Murray‟s criminal trial.88 In November 2000, six months
after Murray‟s criminal acquittal, the LSUC dropped the professional
misconduct charges.89 According to the LSUC Press Release, the
Proceedings Authorization Committee gave Gravely J‟s decision
significant deference, concluding that “the public interest would be
better served by the clarification of lawyers‟ professional
responsibilities when confronted with such a dilemma than by the
continuation of disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Murray.”90
Robert P. Armstrong, Q.C., then the head of the LSUC, announced
the appointment of a committee to consider the issues arising from
the Murray case and to draft a proposal for a new rule to guide
lawyers who face similar dilemmas in the future. 91 Murray had
emerged from the Bernardo affair having escaped from both criminal
and professional sanction.
D. MURRAY‟S REMOVAL FROM BERNARDO
Murray‟s suppression of the tapes ultimately led to his
decision to remove himself from the Bernardo case. As explained by
Associate Professor Benedet, a lawyer who takes possession of
physical evidence risks becoming a witness in her client‟s case.92
Murray would have likely been removed from the case from the very
beginning, when he first took possession of the tapes from Bernardo‟s
house. When a lawyer comes into possession of physical evidence,
Assistant Crown Attorney Humphreys explains, the source of the
evidence becomes important, making the lawyer a witness who is
subject to cross-examination by the Crown. “You need to find out
where the evidence came from,” says Humphreys, adding that “if the
accused walks in and hands the defence a bloody shirt, that is pretty
strong evidence.”93 Defence lawyer Randall Martin agrees, claiming
that “often where the evidence came from is very important.”94
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Benedet, Humphreys, and Martin all agree that because of his
possession of evidence, Murray should have removed himself from the
case.
Murray became uncomfortable when he visited Bernardo on
July 11-12, 1994, when Bernardo told him was going to deny ever
having met Mahaffy or French and that Murray was not to contradict
this position.95 The implication was obvious: Murray was to
permanently suppress the tapes. As a result, Murray asked John Rosen
to take over the Bernardo case in August 1994.96 On September 1,
Murray contacted the office of Austin Cooper for help in removing
himself from the case.97 Cooper wrote to the Professional Conduct
Committee of the LSUC and was sent the following instructions by
Earl Levy Q.C., Paul Copeland, and Colin Campbell Q.C.:

(1)

Mr. Murray should remove himself as counsel
of record for Mr. Bernardo as soon as
practicable.

(2)

Certain material in possession of Mr. Murray
should be delivered to His Honour Judge P.
LeSage in a sealed packet and to be subject to
court determination.

(3)

We are of the view that Mr. Bernardo should
be advised of the steps you intend to take as
soon as possible.98

Murray and Rosen followed the instructions. On September 12, Rosen
took possession of the tapes, and LeSage A.C.J.O.C. ruled that Rosen
could retain the tapes until October 7.99 Murray was also removed
from the Bernardo case on September 12.
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IV
THE DUTY TO CLIENTS
Once retained, a defence lawyer assumes several fundamental
duties to that client, which form the basis of the lawyer-client
relationship. The most obvious duty that a lawyer owes to her client is
the obligation to represent the client resolutely. In cases like
Bernardo, representing clients who have been accused of horrible acts
can cause a considerable ethical dilemma. However, once retained, a
lawyer must suspend such reservations in order to fully defend her
client.
The belief in a lawyer‟s duty to represent her client fully and
loyally is significant. “No matter how notorious [Mr. Bernardo] was
and how egregious his crimes were,” Cooper explains, “under our
system he is entitled to good counsel that will defend him to the best
of their ability.”100 Similarly, Toronto-area lawyers Stephen Grant and
Linda Rothstein identify that a lawyer-client relationship is fiduciary
and thus, the lawyer must represent the client “with undivided
loyalty.”101 Admittedly, a fiduciary obligation can only license legal
behavior and cannot render legally-permissible what is not otherwise
allowed. In a criminal trial, Gavin Mackenzie adds, this includes a
“duty is to protect the client as far as possible from being convicted
except by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction and upon legal evidence
sufficient to support a conviction for the offence with which the
client is charged.”102 Mackenzie continues by saying that “it is the
professional responsibility of the [defence] counsel in many cases to
prevent the whole truth from coming out by all lawful means,”
allowing for reliance on legal techniques that are not known to be
fraudulent or false.103 This forms an essential part of the criminal
adversarial process and, according to Justice Finlayson in R. v.
Lomage, the role of the “[defence] counsel is every bit as important as
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that of any other party to the proceedings.”104 Murray seems to have
embraced this duty, later explaining that “my responsibility was to my
client…and to present the best defence available to him.”105 Such a
defence, he contended, necessitated suppression of the tapes until
they could be used in cross-examination against Homolka.106 Assistant
Crown Attorney Humphreys suggests that although the tapes do
depict the murders, they show that Bernardo was guilty of a “whole
host of things” and invite strong inferences that Bernardo may have
committed the murders.107 As a result, Bernardo needed a strong
defence for the charges of first-degree murder. Murray‟s strategy was
an attempt to honour his duties to his client.
A. THE DUTY NOT TO JUDGE
In a criminal context, it is essential that a lawyer defend her
client without passing judgment on his guilt or innocence. Thus, it is
important that the defence lawyer reconciles her ethics with the oftasked question: “how can you defend someone who you know to be
guilty?”108 This question is often asked with disgust, many people
feeling that defence lawyers are “worse than the criminals [they]
represent” because “[they] know better.”109 According to Professor
Barbara Babcock of the Stanford Law Society, however, most defence
lawyers are indifferent to the question.110 Martin Erdmann, former
head of the Supreme Court branch of New York City‟s Legal Aid
Society, clarifies, adding that defence lawyers “have nothing to do
with justice. Justice is not even a part of the equation.”111 He adds that
justice is for the courts, not the defence counsel, to determine.
Echoing this statement, defence lawyer Randall Martin adds that
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“whether the accused is lying to me or not is not my judgment to
make.”112
Criminal defence lawyers, it would seem, neither “believe nor
disbelieve their clients, but are in the neutral state of non-belief.”113
By representing clients who they know or believe to be guilty,
Mackenzie feels that defence lawyers are upholding, not offending,
their professional duties.114 In criminal trials, the duty of a lawyer not
to judge her client is essential – and the same has been true for
centuries. Dr. Samuel Johnson, an 18th century English writer claimed
that “in Western democracies…it is no part of defense [sic] lawyers‟
function to determine whether their clients are guilty.”115 The
understanding of defence counsel‟s function has transcended the
centuries and forms an important part of the lawyer-client
relationship, without which defendants would be denied the
opportunity to secure a full legal defence.
B. OBSERVING THE CLIENT‟S INSTRUCTIONS
The final important obligation on the part of a lawyer to her
client is a duty to observe his instructions, if they are legal, ethical,
and pertain to the defence. Such a duty, many would suggest, is where
Murray‟s strategy became problematic. As the client‟s advocate,
defence lawyers are subject to the instructions of a client, within
certain limits. According to Austin Cooper, if a defence lawyer gets
instructions that something should be used to benefit the defence, “he
neglects those instructions at his own risk.”116 Cooper added that had
Murray ignored Bernardo‟s instructions and the tapes were destroyed
with the house, “Murray would have to be concerned about
allegations of incompetence. He didn‟t have any choice.”117
Murray‟s instructions from Bernardo in relation to the tapes
were very clear. Through a note, Bernardo instructed that “we will
have to go through them in the future. At this time I instruct you not
“Martin Interview”, supra note 70.
Robert Megarry, “Convocation Address” (March, 1983) 17 Soc‟y Gaz., no. 1, 41 at
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to view them.”118 Once Murray had decided to retrieve the tapes, he
was not at liberty to disobey Bernardo‟s instructions. According to
some, this is where Murray made his fundamental mistake. Randall
Martin suggests that Murray could have “refused the instructions from
the accused” and Bernardo could have discharged his lawyer. Martin
feels that Murray allowed himself to be taken advantage of by
Bernardo, as lawyers cannot “take blind instructions from a client.”119
Associate Professor Benedet agrees, claiming that “if Bernardo tells
Murray that there were tapes in the house, he does not have an
obligation to call the police. Nor does he have an obligation to go and
get the tapes. He should have left them alone.”120 Loyally adhering to
the instructions of his client may have been the root of Murray‟s
troubles.
V
THE DUTY TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Although having no “generalized duty to justice,”121 as
“officers of the court”122 there are certain elements of the
administration of justice to which defence lawyers are bound.
According to University of Alberta Law Professor Wayne Renke,
lawyers have a duty to “promote the course of justice.”123 Lawyers are
not required to disclose every detail in an all-out search for the truth,
but must respect the administration of justice. As will be discussed,
this expectation likely means that lawyers cannot deceive the court by
lying or offering evidence that they know to be false. Similarly, as the
Murray ordeal confirmed, lawyers may not obstruct the course of
justice nor have involvement in any other illegal activities.
The Rules set out the expectations relating to the duty to
justice but provide little guidance; individual lawyers must determine
Murray, supra note 3 at para. 13.
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how to act in the furtherance of justice. Assistant Crown Attorney
Humphreys explains that for defence lawyers, there are two levels at
which a lawyer has to operate: “everyone has a duty to society at one
level. At another level, there is a duty to the client and the Law
Society.”124 The challenge, he asserts, is for a defence lawyer to
“decide how this meshes with [her] personal ethics.”125 He notes that
in an ideal world, the duty to the administration of justice would force
defence lawyers to disclose all relevant evidence to the Crown. He
concludes, however, that complete disclosure could only be mandated
“if the sole purpose of the criminal process is to get to what the truth
is.”126 The challenge for a defence lawyer is to determine how she will
satisfy her duty to the administration of justice without jeopardizing
her client‟s interests.
Although many of the LSUC‟s contemporary expectations
relating to the administration of justice were unclear, lawyers must
not deceive the court. It is obvious that a lawyer cannot lie to a
court127 nor can she introduce evidence that she knows to be false
because of his client‟s admissions.128 Similarly, the Rules prohibit a
lawyer from knowingly assisting or permitting her clients to do
anything that she sees as being dishonourable or dishonest.129 The
alternative for a lawyer is to put her client on the stand and argue the
case based on his testimony. Before doing this, the lawyer should
discourage the client from lying by advising that false testimony can
result in prosecution for perjury and, if discovered, will act to the
detriment of the client‟s case.130 Randall Martin suggests that although
you cannot put the client on the stand knowing that they are going to
lie, “you can sure put him on the stand thinking that he is going to lie”
because “every once in a while you are wrong about what you
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think.”131 Thus, the defence lawyer must help the client “polish their
story” but must not “change the gist of it.”132 Therefore, it is to the
lawyer‟s advantage to know as little as possible about the client‟s guilt.
“[When] you know that he did whatever he was charged with, you
can no longer make certain representations,” Humphreys explains,
adding that once a defence lawyer “knows [her client] did it, [the
lawyer] cannot go into the courtroom and say that [he] didn‟t do it.”133
Ultimately, the overarching point being made by the example of
client testimony is that lawyers have an unqualified duty to be candid
with the court.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a duty to the
administration of justice. Although the current ethical and legal
guidelines are vague, they frame the outer limits as to what is
considered to be acceptable conduct on the part of lawyers. Defence
lawyers have no ethical or legal commitment to the search for the
truth. They are, however, bound by rules that demand honesty and
respect for the court, specifically prohibiting lawyers from engaging
in dishonest tactics before the court. A failure to obey these duties
places a lawyer in danger of professional sanction or criminal
conviction. Therefore, in representing Bernardo, Murray was
prohibited from falsely representing his client. This created a problem
when, in mid-July 1994, Murray was instructed to deny that Bernardo
had ever been in contact with Mahaffy or French.134 The tapes,
Bernardo dictated, were not to contradict this position.135 Situations
like this leave defence lawyers in an extremely difficult position. The
ambiguity of the rules relating to the duty to justice has resulted in
varying interpretations of what is expected of lawyers, as was
highlighted by the Murray case. Ultimately, the duty to the
administration of justice forms one of the two tensions pulling
defence lawyers in opposing directions.
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VI
THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND ITS LIMITS
Perhaps the single most difficult issue facing Murray in the
Bernardo case related to Murray‟s duty of confidentiality not to
disclose privileged communications between himself and his client. In
R. v. Solosky, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) held that “the
concept of privileged communications between a solicitor and his
client has long been recognized as fundamental to the due
administration of justice.”136 This privilege, the Court held, “protects
communications between solicitor and client.”137 Similarly, lawyers
Stephen Grant and Linda Rothstein claim that as a part of a lawyer‟s
fiduciary relationship with her client, a lawyer must preserve her
client‟s confidences, requiring rigorous protection of the client‟s
secrets.138 They add that “it is not only information furnished to a
lawyer by a client that is confidential: all information received on
behalf of a client in a professional capacity is confidential.”139 Lawyer
Rachel Fogl feels that “privilege attaches to all communications made
within the ambit of the solicitor-client relationship,” beginning from
when the client first approaches the lawyer.140 As will be argued
below, a client‟s confidence in his lawyer‟s commitment to
confidentiality is essential to his right to defend against criminal
allegations.
Murray defended his dealings with Bernardo by claiming that
“lawyers are required to keep absolutely confidential all
communications with their clients and are under no obligation to turn
over incriminating evidence.”141 Professor Renke agrees, claiming that
“Bernardo had the right to expect that his communications with his
lawyer would not be disclosed, and Murray was entitled not to
disclose his communications with Bernardo to anyone.”142 Therefore,
Murray‟s belief in his duty to maintain confidentiality is of central
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importance to his ordeal. However, this also seems to be the source of
much of the controversy regarding Murray‟s decision to withhold the
physical evidence.
Implicit in the duty to maintain confidentiality is a duty to
avoid doing anything that would help the case against a lawyer‟s
client. In Szarfer v. Chodos, Callaghan A.C.J.O. held that “the
fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and his client forbids a lawyer
from using any confidential information obtained by him for the
benefit of himself…or to the disadvantage of his client” (emphasis in
original).143 Thus, as is suggested by Associate Professor Benedet, the
duty to confidentiality prohibits the provision of any aid to the
Crown, unless compelled by the law.144 The duty of confidentiality
forces a lawyer to protect communications with her client and
removes any duty to help the prosecution of her client. The
protections afforded to solicitor-client privilege and by extension to
the duty of confidentiality are not, however, absolute.
A. LIMITS OF SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE DUTY OF
CONFIDENTIALITY
Confidentiality arising out of solicitor-client privilege can be
limited in several ways. Perhaps the most obvious limitation is that
such confidentiality cannot extend to a situation from which a crime
would result. For example, privilege does not attach to an instruction
to handle evidence in a manner that itself would constitute a criminal
offense.145 In Murray‟s case, privilege would not attach if Bernardo
asked Murray to retrieve and destroy the tapes to prevent their
seizure by investigators. Similarly, privilege does not attach to the
client‟s announced intention to commit a crime.146 In the evidence
destruction example, privilege would not attach if Bernardo had
indicated his plans to have the tapes destroyed. Ultimately, according
to lawyer Norman Lefstein, privilege cannot be applied if the lawyer
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would be a party to a crime.147 In Murray, Gravely J held that the
tapes were not protected by confidentiality or privilege.148 Therefore,
he concluded, withholding them was itself a criminal act.149
Solicitor-client privilege may be breached in cases where
disclosure is necessary for the lawyer to defend herself against
criminal accusations. Despite the contemporary LSUC rule that “the
lawyer owes the duty of secrecy to every client without
exception…[which] survives the professional relationship after the
lawyer has ceased to act for the client,” solicitor-client privilege may
be limited where a lawyer‟s liberty is threatened by a criminal
prosecution.150 In a pre-trial hearing to determine whether Murray
could break his solicitor-client privilege with Bernardo to defend
himself, Gravely J, after weighing both Bernardo and Murray‟s
interests, held that “there is no doubt that Mr. Bernardo's privilege
must give way to the overwhelming importance of Mr. Murray's right
to full answer and defence.”151 Gravely J held that Bernardo‟s rights
did not disappear, but would yield “to full answer and defence as
necessary.”152 In Murray, since both the defence and Crown positions
related almost exclusively to communications between Murray and
Bernardo, it would have been impossible to try to limit what could be
introduced and thus, “the invasion of Mr. Bernardo's solicitor-client
privilege must be extensive.”153 Despite Bernardo‟s objection that the
violation of privilege would prejudice his pending appeal to the SCC,
it was held that Bernardo‟s chances of a successful application were
slim and the threat of a 10-year jail sentence if Murray were convicted
justified the intrusion.154
A lawyer‟s right to defend herself can also extend to the public
forum. In September 1995, Cooper disclosed publicly that Murray had
Norman Lefstein, “Client Perjury in Criminal Cases: Still in Search of An Answer
(1987-1988) 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 521 at 524-525.
148 For a discussion on the differences between evidence and communications as they
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149 Ibid. at paras. 115, 125.
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not viewed the tapes because of Bernardo‟s instructions. Bernardo‟s
then lawyer, Tony Bryant, claimed that this was a breach of privilege
and vowed to register a complaint with the LSUC.155 Speaking publicly
seems to be included in the allowance for full answer and defence. So
long as the balance of the full defence outweighs the need to maintain
the privilege, the privilege can be vitiated. Otherwise, the privilege
remains intact. As a result, there were no further law society
proceedings relating to this potential breach of confidence.156 Under
today‟s Rules, this would be an acceptable breach of confidentiality
under Rule 2.03(4)(a).157 During Murray‟s ordeal, solicitor-client
privilege may have been broken only to the extent necessary to allow
for full answer and defence.158
Another limit on the expectation of confidentiality between a
solicitor and client is engaged when the subject matter of the
conversation falls outside of the “umbrella of solicitor-client
privilege.”159 The tapes, suggests Professor Renke, did not fall within
the protected sphere of communications for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice but rather, were “pre-existing non-communications.”160
He added that the denial of privilege to objects such as the tapes that
were “created for their own purposes, without any reference to
obtaining legal assistance” is constitutionally sound.161 Renke
concludes that so long as Bernardo‟s rights against illegal search and
seizure were protected, the tapes were subject to lawful apprehension
by the prosecution.162 Gravely J agreed, finding that “videotapes are
not communications” and that “Murray's discussions with his client
about the tapes are covered by the privilege; the physical objects, the
tapes, are not.”163 Similarly, W.B. Williston and R. J. Rolls claim that
“documents existing before litigation was conceived and not brought
into existence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice are not free
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from the duty to produce.”164 In order to qualify for solicitor-client
privilege, “the communication must be made in order to elicit
professional advice from the lawyer based upon his or her expertise in
the law.”165 Ultimately, because they predated the solicitor-client
relationship and were non-communications, the tapes were not
covered by solicitor-client privilege.
Although privilege is essential to the solicitor-client
relationship, it is not absolute. It requires that a lawyer not disclose
any of the communications that have taken place as a direct result of
the accused seeking legal advice. This privilege does not extend to
communications that would constitute a criminal offense or an
intention to commit a criminal offense and may be broken when a
lawyer must defend herself against criminal charges. Finally, privilege
does not attach to communications that predate the solicitor-client
relationship or to non-communications, such as the tapes.
VII
THE SOLICITOR-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE
LEGAL SYSTEM
Allowing the solicitor-client relationship to function
relatively freely is essential to preserving the integrity of the legal
system. If criminal sanctions against the accused are to be seen as
being legitimate, they must only be assessed after a full and impartial
trial, during which the accused is given the opportunity to defend
himself. As defendants are only rarely themselves lawyers, they often
need to rely on the expertise of legal experts. Therefore, the
protection of the solicitor-client relationship forms a crucial part of
the criminal system. This analysis will now examine the importance
of the solicitor-client relationship in the criminal sphere,
demonstrating that interference with the trust between a lawyer and
client has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of Canada‟s
criminal justice system.
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In The Symbols of Government, Yale Law Professor Thurman
Arnold argues that the criminal trial is “the center [sic] of ideals of
every Western government” in that it embodies the “greater
principles which give dignity to the individual.”166 As such, “the
notion that every man however lowly is entitled to a trial and an
impartial hearing is regarded as the cornerstone of civilized
government.”167
In R v. Seaboyer, the SCC added to this idea, when Justice
McLachlin (as she then was) held that “the right of the innocent not
to be convicted is dependent on the right to present full answer and
defence,” which “depends on being able to call the evidence necessary
to establish a defence and to challenge the evidence called by the
prosecution.”168 McLachlin J (as she then was) added that this right
includes an “opportunity adequately to state [one‟s] case.”169 In R. v.
Mills, the SCC affirmed this holding, calling the right to full answer
and defence a “principle of fundamental justice” which is protected by
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.170 McLachlin J (as she then was)
held in Mills that Seaboyer established that:
both s. 7 [of the Charter] and the guarantee of a right
to a fair trial enshrined in s. 11(d) are „inextricably
intertwined‟ and protect a right to full answer and
defence” and that this right is also connected to “other
principles of fundamental justice „such as the
presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, and
the principle against self-incrimination.‟171
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A denial of the right to full answer and defence would surely be an
infringement of constitutionally-protected principles. Seaboyer
suggests that if the “evidentiary bricks needed to build a defence” are
denied, then “for that accused the defence has been abrogated as
surely as it would be if the defence itself was held to be unavailable to
him.”172 Thus, if part of the full answer and defence is premised on
physical evidence, the following issues arise.
A. TRUST IN THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
The integrity of the Canadian criminal system requires that
the lawyer representing the accused be fully-informed about the facts
of the case.173 A criminal defendant is only rarely an expert in
criminal law, and thus is not likely to know what information should
be revealed to his lawyer to aid in his full answer and defence.174 It
follows logically that the accused should be free to disclose all
relevant facts to his lawyer without worrying about selfincrimination. As was held in by the SCC in Smith v. Jones, “clients
seeking advice must be able to speak freely to their lawyers secure in
the knowledge that what they say will not be divulged without their
consent.”175 This requires that the solicitor-client relationship be
carefully protected by strict standards of privilege. Ultimately, “the
right to counsel would be meaningless if accused persons were not
free to communicate fully with their lawyers.”176
Within a solicitor-client relationship, if trust in
confidentiality is lacking, a client would likely not share important
information with his lawyer, for fear that the Crown would discover
this information. Without being fully-informed, a lawyer‟s ability to
effectively defend the accused would be inhibited. Therefore, it is
essential to the protection of the right to full answer and defence that
lawyer-client communications be protected completely within the
bounds of solicitor-client privilege. To allow lawyers to disclose
information to anyone, either directly or indirectly, “would destroy
Seaboyer, supra note 168 at para. 34.
Mackenzie, supra note 102 at 7-6.
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the benefits to be derived by accused persons from professional
assistance.”177 The law of privilege, Professor Renke explains, is
extended to the accused‟s right not to incriminate himself and thus,
must also extend to lawyer-client communications. The decision to
talk with a lawyer is not a decision to talk with prosecuting
authorities.178 According to lawyer Rachel Fogl, “members of the legal
community acknowledge that, without guaranteed security, an
effective relationship between the lawyer and his client would be
impossible, and without this relationship, the system would lie in
shambles.”179 Any interference with privilege encourages distrust of
lawyers by their clients, lowers the efficacy of representation, and
damages the administration of justice. In Murray‟s case, forcing the
disclosure of the tapes arguably undermined his role as an advocate. In
fact, if lawyers must promote the administration of justice, they must
also work to avoid distrust between themselves and their client.180
Compelling the disclosure of evidence is at obvious odds with this
idea, even if it is required, at present, by law. If clients cannot trust
that the communications with their lawyers are absolutely secure, no
such disclosure will occur.
If a lawyer is to effectively represent a client in a criminal
trial, it may be necessary to take possession of physical evidence.
According to Renke, the accused has the right to have inculpatory
evidence assessed by his lawyer and has no obligation to voluntarily
provide non-privileged evidence to the prosecution. For the evidence
to be properly assessed, it may have to pass into the hands of the
lawyer. Renke asks: “should the mere fact that counsel obtains
custody of the evidence for the purposes of an assessment cause a
constitutional transformation, so that now counsel has the immediate
obligation to disclose the evidence to the State?”181 This would
interfere with the accused‟s right to remain silent and would impose
an unreasonable obligation to disclose to the prosecution, merely
because the client is exercising his right to retain and instruct
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counsel.182 Gravely J held that the tapes did, in fact, undergo a
constitutional transformation when they were retrieved by Murray.
Compelling the disclosure of evidence provided to an
accused‟s lawyer with the understanding of the existence and
paramount nature of privilege causes significant problems. As per the
SCC in Seaboyer and Mills, the right to full answer and defence is a
principle of fundamental justice. This right includes being able to call
the evidence necessary to establish a defence. Moreover, to establish
an effective defence, a lawyer must be fully-informed from the client
about the facts of the case. Without trust that there will be no
disclosure to third parties, it is unlikely that a client will provide all
information or evidence relevant to his defence. Compelling the
defence to disclose evidence produced under the belief that it is
protected by privilege and will remain confidential undermines
entirely the trust between the lawyer and client.
VIII
IS THERE A DUTY TO DISCLOSE?
As the holding in Murray confirmed, there is a duty to
disclose physical evidence in the possession of defence counsel in
certain circumstances. The oft-mentioned bloody knife or smoking
gun, for example, is physical evidence that must be turned over.
Defence lawyer Randall Martin explains that by retaining this type of
evidence, the defence may be hiding a key piece of evidence that has
little or no exculpatory value.183 Similarly, lawyer Earl Cherniak
claims that counsel cannot “harbour for the safe keeping a bloody
piece of clothing given to him by a client, where he knows or suspects
that the clothing will be evidence on a pending charge.”184 Although
this may force a lawyer to withdraw from the case, a lawyer has a
duty to turn evidence that is overwhelmingly inculpatory over to the
prosecution.185
Save examples of bloody murder weapons, whether a duty to
disclose exists remains unclear. Although Rachel Fogl explains that
182
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“lawyers have a duty to turn over evidence relevant to a criminal
offense,”186 Assistant Crown Attorney Humphreys claims that he does
not expect to see much evidence volunteered by the defendant.187
Humphreys adds that although the Crown would like to see evidence,
the defence is often under no obligation to turn the evidence over.188
Former Ontario Attorney General David Young, however, is of a
stronger view, believing that there is never an excuse for withholding
evidence.189
The ruling in Murray that counsel may not oppose the
legitimate seizure of evidence does not necessarily mean that there is
a reciprocal duty to disclose the evidence to the prosecution. Gravely J
held that “it does not follow that because concealment of
incriminating physical evidence is forbidden there is always a
corresponding positive obligation to disclose.”190 There is a difference,
Gravely J maintains, between actively concealing evidence and
holding it with a willingness to comply with a legal seizure order.
Professor Renke agrees, suggesting that “the lack of a right to oppose
disclosure is not equivalent to a duty to disclose.”191 He adds that
“because the accused has the (general) right not to incriminate himself
or herself, the accused is not obligated or has no legal duty to assist
the State in gathering evidence against himself or herself” subject to
the limitation that the defence cannot destroy the evidence or prevent
the authorities from obtaining the evidence by legitimate means.192
Alan Gold, former head of the Criminal Lawyers‟ Association,
claims that requiring the defence to turn physical evidence over to the
Crown would “turn the [defence] lawyer into an assistant of the
police…[and defence] lawyers…are not part of the Crown team.”193
Randall Martin likens the situation to the discovery of a witness that
186
187
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could devastate the accused‟s case: “if, in private, I examined a witness
and I find out that my client is clearly guilty, I have no obligation to
tell the Crown or to turn over this evidence. If the Crown can‟t
uncover it themselves, then there is no duty to turn the information
over.”194 Similarly, lawyer Daniel Monteith considers the tapes in
Murray to be more like a confession than a murder weapon. He claims
that the Bernardo tapes were the “ultimate confession” and “everyone
accepts that if a lawyer‟s client confesses, the lawyer has no duty to
provide the confession to the Crown.”195 He adds that “the situation is
much different from the case where a lawyer‟s client hands over the
murder weapon. Turning over the murder weapon is not tantamount
to a confession.”196 Ultimately, the fact that evidence may not be
protected in any way by solicitor-client privilege does not necessarily
confer an obligation of disclosure to the Crown.
If physical evidence is to be disclosed, it seems that defence
lawyers may retain evidence for a reasonable amount of time before
turning it over. Austin Cooper claims that inculpatory physical
evidence given to a defence lawyer during a legal consultation could
“clearly be withheld for a reasonable period of time.”197 After the
expiry of this period, however, Cooper claims that the lawyer should,
“as an officer of the court, on his own motion turn the [evidence] over
to the prosecution.”198 Assistant Crown Attorney Humphreys agrees,
claiming that “the defence can retain the evidence for a reasonably
short period of time.”199 When the evidence is disclosed, however, the
defence lawyer must be careful how this is done. The evidence should
be turned over without comment or through a third party to maintain
confidentiality.200 Consequently, the prosecution, when presenting the
evidence, must be careful not to reveal the source of the evidence to
the jury.201 This will help to preserve the integrity of the lawyer-client
relationship.
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IX
OPPOSING DUTIES OF CANDOR AND CONFIDENTIALITY
As has been established, it is clear that lawyers have duties
both to their clients and to the administration of justice. These duties
pull defence lawyers in opposite directions and force them to strike a
delicate balance. In the Murray ordeal, the balance between the
competing obligations of candor202 and confidentiality was at definite
odds. Unfortunately for Murray, these duties seem to have been
mutually exclusive in certain respects. This paper will now examine
the tension created by the competing duties faced by criminal defence
lawyers, in an effort to demonstrate how the Bernardo case placed
Murray in an exceptionally difficult position.
The competing duties of candor and confidentiality are
extremely difficult to reconcile. The expectations of the LSUC are
unclear, compelling lawyers to determine the relative value they will
place on candor and confidentiality. Monroe Freedman calls this the
“lawyer‟s dilemma,” and illustrates the contradicting expectations by
explaining that “the lawyer has a duty to know everything, to hold it
in confidence, and to reveal it to the court.”203 The problem is
immediately apparent: lawyers have an obligation to be candid with
the court; they also have a duty of strict confidentiality about much
that is learned during the course of their professional relationship.204
Although lawyers have a general duty not to destroy or conceal
physical evidence of a crime, there is significant “tension…between
that duty to not either conceal or destroy evidence of a crime on the
one hand and a lawyer‟s duty to confidentiality on the other.”205
Professor Renke clarifies that when a lawyer takes possession of
physical evidence, they are tugged in opposing directions by
competing duties:
On the one hand, considerations of confidentiality and
advocacy support retaining the evidence without disclosure.
On the other hand, considerations of the lawyer‟s
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professional independence from the client and the lawyer‟s
relationship with the administration of justice support
turning the evidence over to the Crown. 206

This was exactly the problem faced by Murray. His duty of
loyalty to Bernardo suggested that it was in his client‟s interest to
have the tapes emerge during the cross-examination of Homolka.
Conversely, his obligation to the administration of justice suggested
that the tapes should have been disclosed to the Crown. This put
Murray in an incredibly difficult position. Randall Martin claims that
he is “always sympathetic for Ken [Murray]”207 and K.R., in an
editorial in Law Times, writes that “no criminal lawyer wants to be
placed in the position in which Mr. Murray found himself.”208
Associate Professor Benedet, who is generally unsympathetic towards
Murray, notes that his dilemma was significant.209 Even John Rosen,
Murray‟s replacement, took three weeks after viewing the tapes to
decide what to do. “I think, though, that…members of the legal
profession, understand that a lawyer‟s obligation to a client, the
solicitor-client privilege aspect, supersedes just about every other
obligation that we have,” commented Murray on the difficulties he
faced.210 He added that although the public may not understand, as
long as lawyers respect the LSUC guidelines and historical limits of
the solicitor-client relationship, they are acting within the allowable
bounds. According to Murray, this rule was “one that I abided by to
the end, when I was directed to do otherwise.”211 The ultimate
question becomes “where is the line to be drawn between counsel‟s
duty to the administration of justice and his or her duties to the
clients?”212
With little guidance on where to draw the line between
candor and confidentiality from the Rules, lawyers are left to try to
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find existing jurisprudence on the matter at issue213, to fend for
themselves214, or else, they are forced to contact the LSUC for advice.
Unfortunately, Murray‟s case served to demonstrate the
ineffectiveness of LSUC assistance during times of evidentiary
uncertainty. After Austin Cooper‟s request for guidance on what to do
with the tapes, the LSUC directed that the tapes be “delivered to His
Honour Judge P. LeSage in a sealed packet.”215 On September 12, 1994
these instructions were followed, but the LSUC‟s advice and resulting
adjournment allowed Rosen to retain the tapes until at least October
7.216
Without effective LSUC guidance, defence lawyers are
themselves forced to determine how to balance the duties of
confidentiality and candor. David Layton suggests that this requires
that a lawyer determine whether and how the duty of loyalty will be
engaged.217 When deciding where to draw the line, Monroe Freedman
suggests that the duty of candor should be interpreted narrowly to
avoid interfering with a lawyer‟s duty not to disclose confidential
information to the court, either directly or indirectly.218 The holding
in Seaboyer may help to clarify the issue. McLachlin J (as she then
was) held that the principles of fundamental justice, including the
right to call evidence for full answer and defence, should reflect a
“spectrum of interests, from the rights of the accused to broader
societal concerns.”219 This holding favours a highly contextual
approach, where a lawyer balances the rights of the accused with the
rights of society to determine the weight with which the conflicting
duties should be engaged. However, there are no clear answers –
See Murray, supra note 3 at paras. 80, 149.
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lawyers are forced to make a personal judgment while the defence is
underway.
The balance between the competing duties of confidentiality
and candor is difficult to achieve and led to Murray‟s struggles. He
had duties of loyalty and confidentiality to Bernardo, which favoured
retaining the tapes until Homolka took the stand. Conversely, Murray
also had a duty to be candid with the court and to avoid obstruction of
justice, which suggested that the tapes should have been disclosed. In
attempting to achieve a very difficult balance between the somewhat
exclusive duties, Murray decided to suppress the tapes until trial.
Although there was little guidance available to Murray, Gravely J later
decided that Murray‟s decision to value the duty to his client over his
obligation to candor was wrong. Murray‟s request for direction from
the LSUC demonstrated the ineffective guidance provided by the rules
by themselves and suggests that lawyers are left with few options but
to determine a course of action on their own. According to University
of Toronto Law Professor Peter Rosenthal this “is a very tricky
problem,” and knowing “where to draw the line is very difficult.”220
Without guidance, the conflict between the duties of candor and
confidentiality leaves lawyers in possession of physical evidence
“stuck between a rock and a hard place.”221
X
THE IMPORTANCE OF ETHICAL GUIDELINES
Establishing and maintaining a minimum ethical standard is
essential to ensuring that the public remains confident in the ability of
the legal profession to self-regulate. According to K.R.‟s editorial in
Law Times, “nothing is more important to the long-term future of the
profession than its ethics,” and if lawyers do not keep their “ethical
houses in order,” there will be a lack of confidence in the profession.
The result will be “significant incursions by governments on the selfgoverning nature of the profession,” such as those seen by accountants
in the Enron affair.222 To avoid this loss of confidence, the LSUC must
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establish minimum ethical guidelines. This helps to maintain
confidence in the profession, and consequently, its ability to selfgovern. Not only do ethical standards have to be well-known among
lawyers, but the sanctions for transgressions must be publicized – the
public must see that ethical lapses will not be tolerated. According to
Cooper, Murray faced criminal and professional sanction to maintain
the appearance of ethical standards – he was, in essence, “a scapegoat
to public indignation.”223
Regardless of whether the nuances of Murray‟s duty to
confidentiality and loyalty to Bernardo were understood by the
public, there was a widespread belief that Murray‟s suppression of the
tapes had solely led to Homolka‟s successful plea bargain. According
to Lucinda Vandervort, some hold a belief that lawyers consider
themselves to hold de facto immunity from criminal prosecution for
obstruction of justice, which “is not in the public interest and risks
bringing both the administration of justice and the legal profession
into contempt.”224 Vandervort claims that the Crown‟s failure to
appeal the Murray decision may be taken as tacit support for the belief
that lawyers are immune from prosecution.225 Furthermore, as alluded
to by American defence attorney Gerry Spence, there seems to be a
public belief that in cases of horrendous crimes, accused persons do
not deserve the full benefits of a full defence.226 It follows that there is
also some disdain amongst the public for those who defend
individuals accused of these crimes. As such, despite the nuanced
ethical and legal rules allowing lawyers to suppress evidence in
certain circumstances, the public is likely to see these tactics as
illegitimate. In the public eye, Murray‟s actions allowed Homolka to
negotiate a deal that halved her likely sentence from the one she
would have received had the videotapes surfaced earlier.227 Either
unaware or unconcerned with the subtleties of criminal defence, the
public saw Murray‟s dealing with the tapes as a culpable act. Murray‟s
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suppression of the tapes was not acceptable to the public and, as this
paper has discussed, public confidence is essential to the continued
self-regulation of the profession and the maintenance of the solicitorclient relationship. Therefore, clear ethical guidance for lawyers is
essential to help ensure that the problems in Murray never occur
again.
A. PERSONAL ETHICAL CODES
Although guidelines set out by the LSUC are important, they
cannot entirely create ethical standards for individual lawyers.
Developing personal standards allows individual lawyers to pre-empt
ethical problems, as opposed to relying on the LSUC to react to ethical
transgressions. Neither the public nor the profession is well-served by
relying on criminal or disciplinary proceedings to express ethical
standards.228 Since the Rules cannot address every possible situation,
Rule 1.03(1)(f) instructs that “a lawyer should observe the rules in the
spirit as well as in the letter.”229 Although this Rule would not have
applied to Murray (it was adopted in 2000 and amended in 2007), it
illustrates that the Law Society recognizes the natural limitations of a
universal code of conduct. Lawyers must develop personal ethical
codes to address deficiencies inherent in any code of conduct. Such
action will help the personal reputation of the lawyer and may help
increase public confidence in the profession.

B. THE FORMER RULE 10
In Murray, Gravely J examined Rule 10230 of the LSUC
Professional Conduct handbook, concluding that “it is of small help
either to counsel or to clients who may believe that both their secrets
and their evidence are safe with their lawyers.”231 The Rule read in
part:
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The Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct (Toronto: Law
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231 Murray, supra note 3 at para. 148.
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2.

The lawyer must discharge this duty by fair and
honourable means, without illegality and in a
manner consistent with the lawyer's duty to treat
the tribunal with candor, fairness, courtesy and
respect.
The lawyer must not, for example:
…

(e)

knowingly attempt to deceive a
tribunal or influence the course of
justice
by
offering
false
evidence… suppressing what
ought to be disclosed, or
otherwise assisting in any fraud,
crime or illegal conduct…232

The Rule, according to Gravely J, gave Murray the belief that “he had
no legal duty to disclose the tapes until resolution discussions or trial”
as there is no guidance as to what “ought to be disclosed.”233 Partially
as a result of the vagueness of the rules of professional conduct, it was
held that Murray had a genuine belief in the legality of withholding
the tapes. Therefore, he did not have the requisite mens rea to be
guilty of obstruction of justice.
Murray‟s confusion by the imprecision of Rule 10 was shared
by others. Gravely J refers to “extensive discussion” about how the
Rule applies to the particular facts of the Bernardo case and held that
there were at least 15 journals discussing the topic. He ruled that,
although Murray had only made a superficial attempt to establish the
parameters of his ethical obligations, had he conducted thorough
research, he may have remained confused.234 Although Murray
eventually contacted the LSUC for advice, he was not given any
substantial direction because “the rules were so vague as to be useless
to his plight.”235 LSUC Treasurer Gavin MacKenzie (then Chair of the
Professional Regulation Committee) claimed that “the Canadian
authorities…don‟t assist in answering the question of just where are
Ibid.
Ibid. at para. 151.
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the limits of the lawyer‟s duty not to conceal evidence of a crime.”236
Moreover, some Canadian commentators investigating a lawyer‟s
ethical duties relating to inculpatory physical evidence “have
complained about the serious lack of guidance provided by the
governing bodies‟ rules of professional conduct.”237 Although
commentators differ as to whether this confusion should have been
used to justify an acquittal,238 there is consensus that the rules were
unclear.
The expectations of ethical standards must be made wellknown and transgressions must be dealt with publicly. There seems to
be a belief among the public that a defendant accused of horrible
crimes should not be afforded the full protection of the law during his
investigation and trial. The accused‟s lawyer, it follows, faces public
criticism when nuanced legal and ethical techniques allow her client
to escape punishment when the public has determined that that
individual is guilty. When the ethical allowances of techniques like
the suppression of evidence until trial are misunderstood, lawyers are
seen as being wrong and deserving of punishment. Ethical guidance is
important for lawyers facing difficult ethical dilemmas. The Murray
case has, to some degree, helped to “clarify for defence lawyers what
has long been a gray area – their obligations concerning evidence.”239
XI
SOME GUIDANCE
Although many of the ethical and legal questions faced by
defence lawyers in possession of physical evidence remain unclear,
the Murray case has provided some general direction. Gravely J‟s
Canadian Press, supra note 200.
Layton, supra note 44 at 484.
238 Lawyers David Layton and Michel Proulx claim that to the extent that the rules are
unclear, “counsel should err on the side of caution and seek if at all possible to
resolve the uncertainty without putting himself or herself at risk of prosecution.”
They add that this is much like what should happen when an emergency on an
airplane deploys the oxygen masks: take care of yourself first or you will be unable
to help others, Layton, supra note 44 at 492-493. Conversely, lawyer Daniel
Monteith feels that “where even criminal lawyers and judges are uncertain of the
law and, thus, the law is not readily ascertainable, ignorance of the law should be a
[defence],” Monteith, supra note 195.
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three options have left defence lawyers with some, albeit few, avenues
when they are in possession of inculpatory physical evidence. The
holding in Murray imparts on a defence lawyer an obligation to
disclose evidence in her possession and a corresponding obligation to
inform her client that the evidence may be compelled before
accepting that evidence. In addition to the three outlined by Gravely
J, a potential fourth option, advanced by lawyer George Carter will be
discussed below along with the other above-mentioned options; a
discussion of the implications of copying the tapes in Murray will
follow. The LSUC‟s proposed rule will then be discussed and it will be
shown that although the rule addressed many of the concerns in the
Murray case, it faced significant opposition, leading to its demise.
Finally, in light of the direction provided by the Murray case, advice
for lawyers will be outlined. Although many of the legal and ethical
questions arising from the Murray case remain unanswered, the case
has added to the patchwork of guidance currently available to
lawyers.
A. OPTIONS AND OBLIGATIONS FROM MURRAY
In Murray, Gravely J provided three options for lawyers
dealing with inculpatory physical evidence. The choices range from
an extreme option, which would require immediate forfeiture of the
evidence to the authorities, to a limited option, which would treat all
evidence produced during the solicitor-client relationship as
something over which privilege could be argued.240 In the latter
option, the defence would be obliged to disclose the existence of the
tapes only in very limited circumstances.241 According to lawyers
Peter Brauti and Gena Argitis, formulating a problem-free solution is
extremely difficult, as a rule balancing conflicting duties can always
be seen as being too one-sided.242 Gravely J, however, formulated a
rule that strikes a balance between the extreme and limited options
For commentary on the extreme option (disclose all), see A.L. Macdonald and J.E.
Pink, “Murder, Silence and Physical Evidence: The Dilemma of Client
Confidentiality” (1997) 2 Can. Crim. L.R. 111 at 124. For commentary on the
limited option (disclose very little), see David Tanovich, “Smoking Guns, Bloody
Shirts, and Videotapes: A Virtual Round Table Discussion” (1997) 18:2 Ontario
Criminal Lawyers‟ Association Newsletter 7, online: QL (CLAN).
241 Brauti, supra note 49 at 223.
240
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mentioned above. It was held that Murray, once he had discovered
the “overwhelming significance” of the tapes, was left with three
legally justifiable options:
(a)

Immediately turn over the tapes to the
prosecution, either directly or anonymously;

(b)

Deposit them with the trial judge; or

(c)

Disclose their existence to the prosecution and
prepare to do battle to retain them.243

Although these options eliminate the element of surprise, the defence
has the chance to justify its case for suppression of the evidence under
option (c). The options strike a balance between mandating that the
tapes be turned over and allowing them to be withheld for trial.
Murray‟s tactic of complete suppression, however, is impossible.
Gravely J‟s options direct that all inculpatory physical
evidence should, at the very least, be disclosed to either the Crown or
the trial judge. The ruling, Wayne Renke claims, would make it
“difficult for post-Murray lawyers to claim in Murray-like
circumstances that they believed that concealing evidence was
lawful.”244 Cooper agrees, claiming that following Murray, defence
counsel would have trouble contending that there is no duty to
disclose the existence of incriminating evidence.245 The practical effect
therefore, is that lawyers no longer have surprise as a tactical
advantage, or as Associate Professor Benedet calls it, “defence by
ambush,” available to them at trial.246 The options limit the difficult
ethical and legal questions that Murray faced when lawyers come into
possession of inculpatory physical evidence. Although having
surrendered the “defence by ambush” tactic, criminal defence lawyers
are now faced with less uncertainty.
The decision in Murray has also created a duty for defence
lawyers to advise their clients that the possession of physical evidence
by the lawyer might not be covered by privilege. Cooper suggests that
post-Murray lawyers should advise their clients that inculpatory
Murray, supra note 3 at para. 124.
Renke, supra note 122 at 194.
245 Cooper, supra note 68 at 155.
246 “Benedet Interview”, supra note 72.
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physical evidence could lead to a conviction and that, if the evidence
is turned over to the defence lawyer, there may be a legal compulsion
to disclose the evidence to the Crown or trial judge. Therefore,
accused persons should keep the evidence but must be advised of the
potential for criminal prosecution if they destroy it.247 Although
Gravely J‟s options imply a duty to warn the client about the dangers
of turning over physical evidence, this warning can create problems.
Cooper suggests that some clients may not be concerned with being
prosecuted for the destruction of evidence, particularly if the evidence
is central to serious charges, as was the case in Bernardo. Moreover,
lawyers face the possibility of being accused of counseling the
destruction of evidence, despite their warnings to the contrary.248 The
options necessitate that a lawyer warns her client that her possession
of evidence could eventually lead to compelled disclosure.
B. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE JUSTICE GRAVELY RULING
Former Ontario Judge George Carter has put forward a fourth
option not mentioned in Murray. Carter claims that Murray could,
and should, have “immediately viewed and forthwith returned the
tapes to their hiding place and kept his mouth shut about their
existence.”249 This option would have allowed investigators to return
to Bernardo‟s residence to retrieve the tapes after their 71-day
investigation had finished, thereby circumventing the substance of
the obstruction of justice problem stemming from their lengthy
suppression. However, Carter‟s option would still render Murray a
witness to the location of the tapes, if they were discovered and
presented in trial. As a result, Murray would have had to recuse
himself from the case and could be called to testify against his former
client. A similar problem would occur if Murray had copied the tapes
(as he did in May 1993)250 and returned them to their original location
in Bernardo‟s home. Although this would have allowed Murray to
retain the tactical advantage of surprising the Crown during
Homolka‟s cross-examination, it could again result in his being called
247
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as an evidentiary witness, given that he knew the location of the tapes
in Bernardo‟s home.
C. THE LSUC‟S PROPOSED RULE
Although Gravely J‟s holding in Murray illuminates some of
the issues faced by defence lawyers in possession of inculpatory
physical evidence, there is a need for further clarification from the
LSUC. In the statement dropping the professional misconduct
complaints against Murray, the LSUC announced that it would draft a
new rule for the handling of incriminating evidence that would be
beneficial to both sides.251 The need for the rule was apparent.
According to Murray, “if it ever comes up in the future, other lawyers
won‟t have the same difficulties wallowing through an unknown
field” if there was a new rule.252 According to LSUC Professional
Regulation Committee member Clayton Ruby, “the committee will
look at how to make guidelines that are clear enough so that even the
dumbest lawyer on Earth will be able to figure out you can‟t do
this.”253 Of course, all lawyers should refer to existing jurisprudence as
well, as Rosen did and Murray did not.254 K.R.‟s editorial in Law Times
claimed that it was vitally important that the benchers of the LSUC
work to provide guidance on the issue of inculpatory physical
evidence.255 Similarly, Gail Cohen claimed that the LSUC needed to
bring about changes to provide guidance to lawyers facing this
dilemma.256 Bowing to the pressure of its membership and the
comments on the lack of guidance made by Gravely J, the LSUC‟s
Special Committee on Lawyer‟s Duties with Respect to Physical
Evidence Relevant to a Crime developed a proposed rule in 2001.257
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The LSUC‟s proposed rule recognized the conflict between a
lawyer‟s duties to a client and to the administration of justice,
directing that any lawyer who comes into the possession of physical
evidence should seek the advice of senior counsel or the LSUC. The
proposed rule, to apply to all non-privileged evidence, read as follows:
4.01(10) A lawyer who is asked to receive or does receive
from a client or another person on behalf of a client
physical evidence relevant to a crime shall not
(a) counsel or participate in the concealment of the
evidence, or
(b) destroy, alter or otherwise deal with the
evidence or permit the evidence to be dealt
with in a manner which the lawyer reasonably
believes
(i) may lead to its destruction or alteration,
(ii) poses a risk of physical harm to any
person, or
(iii) may otherwise lead to an obstruction
of justice.258

The commentary accompanying the proposed rule recognized that
“[a] lawyer owes duties of loyalty and confidentiality to his or her
client and must act in the client‟s best interests by providing
competent and dedicated representation.” However, “[a] lawyer also
owes duties to the administration of justice, which require, at
minimum, that the lawyer not violate the law, improperly impede a
police investigation, or otherwise obstruct the course of justice.”259
The rule contained a handful of exemptions that would allow
lawyers to retain evidence in certain circumstances. According to
Committee member Todd Ducharme, the exemptions were vital to
allow defence lawyers to represent their clients without
Ministry of the Attorney General), and Tony Loparco (president of the Ontario
Crown Attorneys‟ Association). The Law Society of Upper Canada (Policy
Secretariat), “Special Committee on Lawyer‟s Duties with Respect to Physical
Evidence Relevant to a Crime, Second Interim Report to Convocation” (22 June
2001), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/evidencecommitteerpt.pdf>
[LSUC Proposal].
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compromising the clients or violating solicitor-client privilege. Before
using an exemption, lawyers would have to obtain the consent of the
Evidence Review Committee.260 Lawyers could temporarily withhold
evidence under five circumstances:
1. To avoid future harm;
2. To prevent destruction of evidence;
3. To make arrangements to transfer evidence to
authorities pursuant to instructions;
4. To examine or test the evidence; and
5. To make effective use of evidence at trial.261
The ability to temporarily withhold evidence is similar to the
American Bar Association‟s Code of Conduct for defence lawyers.262
The Committee was absolute in its opposition to a rule that would
compel all evidence to be turned over to the Crown.263 It addressed
the significant problems arising in Murray and struck a compromise
between prosecutors and defence lawyers, without requiring that all
evidence be surrendered without question. Instead of being embraced,
however, the rule faced vehement opposition.
D. OPPOSITION TO THE LSUC‟S PROPOSED RULE
Despite incorporating elements designed to strike a
compromise between the duty to clients and to the administration of
justice, the proposed rule faced significant opposition. Much of the
resistance came from prosecutors and the police, who felt that the rule
allowed for the inappropriate suppression of evidence. Former
Ontario Attorney General David Young claimed that even the
temporary concealment of evidence can be seen as the obstruction of
justice and “that a rule of professional conduct of the Law Society of
Upper Canada would purport to sanction such conduct is nothing
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short of scandalous.”264 Prosecutors and the Attorney General took the
position that there is never an excuse to withhold evidence from the
authorities265 and the proposal allowed for evidence to be suppressed
for significant periods of time.266 Consequently, David Young
considered overriding the rule if it was adopted.267
The Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (“OACP”) also
opposed the proposal, claiming that it would not have provided
sufficient guidance to cause Murray to “act as Mr. Justice Gravely
ruled he ought to have acted.”268 Going further than merely failing to
provide guidance, the OACP added, that “the draft Rule would have
actively led Mr. Murray to [make a] decision that the Court found to
be criminal acts.”269 The OACP claimed that, under the proposed rule,
the tapes could have been protected from disclosure by solicitor-client
privilege or could have been returned to Bernardo‟s house until the
house was destroyed.270
There were also concerns about seeking the advice of the
LSUC without disclosing the evidence to the prosecution. Asking the
LSUC to review the evidence without disclosing it to the prosecution
deprives the Committee of the prosecution‟s opinion on the
allegations. The Committee would not be told of any plea negotiations
that were occurring with a co-accused, nor would information arising
out of the ongoing investigation be presented. Therefore, the concern
was that “the [C]ommittee will not possess sufficient information to
ensure that the administration of justice is not harmed by the
withholding of evidence.”271 There was also opposition to the drafting
of a bright line rule in these situations by defence lawyers.272 Despite
the LSUC‟s efforts to cater to the competing interests of prosecutors
and defence teams, opposition to the proposed rule was strong.
David Gambrill, “Stringent new rules on criminal evidence” Law Times (25 March
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Consequently, the rule was never adopted and lawyers facing ethical
dilemmas involving inculpatory physical evidence remain without
strong guidance in the Rules.

E. ADVICE FOR LAWYERS
The failure to draft rules to help lawyers facing problems with
physical evidence has left defence lawyers in a state of uncertainty
relating to the possession of physical evidence. Some guidance,
however, does emerge from the Murray case. According to Gavin
Mackenzie, “the overwhelming lesson [from the Murray case] is that
generally speaking, you shouldn‟t take possession of property that‟s
related to an offense.”273 Indeed, Randall Martin feels that “Murray
should never have come into possession of the tapes.”274 University of
Toronto Law Professor Kent Roach states that “this whole sorry
episode would have gone no further” if Murray “had simply refused to
go and get the tapes.”275 If a client will not disclose the contents of the
evidence that they are instructing their lawyer to collect, Martin
claims that the lawyer should not retrieve it. He adds that the
evidence “already…sounds like something that I don‟t want to have”
and that Murray happened to get Pandora‟s Box.276 Crown Attorney
Ian Scott claims that after Murray, it would be hard for defence
lawyers to argue that suppression of inculpatory evidence would not
be a crime.277 Clayton Ruby, a member of the Committee that drafted
the proposed rule, claims that although there is no problem in keeping
secret exculpatory evidence for use at trial, there “is grave danger in
taking possession or control of evidence that is useful to the
Crown.”278 Therefore, lawyers should be very careful before taking
possession of any item of evidence. Although there is still significant
uncertainty relating to physical evidence, defence lawyers should act
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cautiously and remember that “if you don‟t want to have to turn the
evidence over, don‟t come into possession of it.”279
XII
THE CURRENT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Although adopted after the completion of much of Murray‟s
ordeal and having undergone several amendments since, today‟s Rules
provide only partial guidance on many of the issues faced by Murray.
The provisions relating to physical evidence are characterized by
general language, often only hinting at what is expected of lawyers.
Conversely, the rules relating to confidentiality and the duties owed
by lawyers both to clients and the administration of justice are quite
clear. This analysis will now examine the rules relating to the
suppression of evidence, client confidentiality, duties to the client,
and the duty to the administration of justice.
As could be expected from the failed rule proposal, the Rules
contain very little about withholding physical evidence relating to a
crime. Rule 4.01(2) contains the most direct guidance for lawyers
dealing with physical evidence. That Rule instructs that “when acting
as an advocate, a lawyer shall not…(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a
tribunal or influence the course of justice by…suppressing what ought
to be disclosed, or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime, or illegal
conduct.”280 As was noted in Gravely J‟s discussion of the former Rule
10, there is no indication as to what “ought to be disclosed.” This rule,
therefore, offers little in the way of guidance to lawyers dealing with
questions involving the possession of physical evidence.
The definition of “professional misconduct” is also ambiguous,
yet it could be interpreted to speak to problems of suppressing
physical evidence. “Professional misconduct” is defined in Rule 1.02 as
professional conduct that tends to bring discredit on the profession,
including “(e) engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”281 As was demonstrated in the previous
discussion, it is possible to interpret the suppression of physical
evidence in certain situations as being prejudicial to the
“Martin Interview”, supra note 70.
Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 229229 at 69.
281 Ibid. at 2.
279
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administration of justice. However, it was also shown that the
suppression of evidence in order to mount a defence for a client may
actually uphold the administration of justice. The guidance provided
by Rules 4.02(e) and 1.02 is ambiguous and provides little help when
lawyers face the issue of possession of physical evidence.
The rules relating to client confidentiality, however, are much
clearer. Rule 2.03(1) instructs that
a lawyer at all times shall hold in strict confidence all
information concerning the business and affairs of the
client acquired in the course of the professional
relationship and shall not divulge any such
information unless expressly or impliedly authorized
by the client or required by law to do so.282
The Rule‟s commentary does allow for confidentiality to be broken,
but only when there is an immanent risk of death or serious bodily
harm to an identifiable person, when a lawyer is accused of
wrongdoing (criminal, civil, or professional),283 or “when required by
law or by order of a tribunal of competent jurisdiction.”284 In these
cases, a lawyer must not disclose more information than is required.
This Rule recognizes the importance of lawyer-client confidentiality,
declaring that “the client must feel completely secure and entitled to
proceed on the basis that, without any express request or stipulation
on the client's part, matters disclosed or discussed with the lawyer
will be held in strict confidence” and that “confidentiality and loyalty
are fundamental to the relationship between a lawyer and client.”285
There is no ambiguity that the duty to maintain confidentiality is
nearly absolute. There are questions however, as to whether the tapes
in the Bernardo case would qualify as “information.” In the Rules, the
words „information‟ and „evidence‟ are used in ways that demonstrate
that they are not necessarily synonymous and therefore it is unclear
whether the tapes would have been protected.286 It is clear that
Ibid. at 19.
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lawyers have an almost absolute duty to hold in strict confidence any
information that arises from the lawyer-client relationship.
The Rules are also clear that the lawyer has a duty to the
client. Rule 4.01(1) holds that “when acting as an advocate, a lawyer
shall represent the client resolutely and honourably within the limits
of the law while treating the tribunal with candor, fairness, courtesy,
and respect.”287 In a defence role, a lawyer has a duty to protect her
client from being convicted “except by a tribunal of competent
jurisdiction and upon legal evidence sufficient to support a conviction
for the offence with which the client is charged.”288 Moreover, a
lawyer should never waive her client‟s rights; the commentary
mentions that, save legal compulsion, the lawyer should never “assist
an adversary or advance matters derogatory to [her] client's case.”289
Therefore, a lawyer has a clear duty to represent her client fully and
loyally. In his defence of Bernardo, it is reasonable to believe that
Murray would have interpreted this Rule as allowing for the
suppression of the tapes until trial, although a closer consultation with
the existing jurisprudence may have lead him to a different
conclusion.290 He has a clear duty both to avoid helping the Crown
and to represent his client resolutely.
The Rules also set out clear duties to the administration of
justice. Rule 4.06(1) instructs that “a lawyer shall encourage public
respect for and try to improve the administration of justice” and Rule
4.01(1) mandates that the lawyers treat the tribunal with candor and
fairness.291 Lawyers must be committed to the concept of equal justice
for all within an impartial system. Moreover, without the respect of
the public, the legal system could not function and thus, “constant
efforts must be made to improve the administration of justice and
thereby maintain public respect for it.”292 To this end, Rule 6.01(1)
dictates that “a lawyer shall conduct himself or herself in such a way
as to maintain the integrity of the profession” such that public
confidence in the administration of justice is not eroded.293 This Rule,
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however, would have done little to help Murray. The vague language
surrounding the duty to the administration of justice could have been
construed so as to permit the suppression of the tapes. As was shown,
Murray felt that “no matter…how egregious his crimes,” Bernardo
was “entitled to good counsel that will defend him to the best of their
ability.”294 According to Murray‟s defence strategy, the suppression of
the tapes represented a significant part of Bernardo‟s defence and
thus, arguably helped to further the administration of justice.
Although there is a clear duty to the administration of justice, this
duty could be interpreted in a manner that would have allowed the
suppression of the tapes.
Even though today‟s Rules provide some direction with
respect to the problems Murray faced, lawyers are left with little
guidance on certain issues, at least by the Rules themselves. As was
shown, the rules relating to incriminating physical evidence do little
to help lawyers facing this situation. Despite the problems with the
language identified by Gravely J, lawyers are simply directed not to
“suppress what ought to be disclosed.”295
XIII
CONCLUSION
In the early-1990s, Paul Bernardo and Karla Homolka
committed unthinkable crimes. Their subsequent prosecutions did,
however, reignite debates over the issues faced by criminal defence
lawyers as they attempt to balance competing duties to clients and to
the administration of justice. This balance is extremely difficult to
achieve, especially with the minimal ethical and legal guidelines
available to lawyers today. Despite all of the discussion, Murray
changed very little for defence lawyers.
The impetus behind Murray‟s obstruction charge was that had
he disclosed the content of the tapes, the Crown would not have
agreed to the lenient plea bargain with Homolka. In so doing, he
seemed to obstruct the course of justice. But when examining his
tactical use of the tapes, Murray‟s guilt could not easily be determined
given the ambiguity inherent in the professional and legal guidelines
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available to him at the time. Despite the fact that the tapes may have
harmed Bernardo‟s case, Murray had a justifiable reason for
withholding the evidence.
Following Murray‟s acquittal, the LSUC recognized its lack of
guidance on the issue, established a committee to draft a proposed
rule, and withdrew the charges of professional misconduct against
Murray. By the end of 2000, Murray had emerged from the Bernardo
affair having avoided criminal and professional sanction, with new
LSUC guidelines to come.
Once retained, lawyers have several duties to their clients.
They have an almost absolute duty of loyalty, which requires that a
lawyer do everything under the law to represent her client as fully as
possible. As officers of the court, however, lawyers also have a
potentially conflicting duty to the administration of justice. This is a
duty owed to society as a whole, which requires that the lawyer treat
the court with candor, not to lie or present deceptive evidence.
Adherence to these somewhat mutually-exclusive duties gave rise to
many of the problems faced by Murray.
The duty of confidentiality is inextricably linked to solicitorclient privilege and imposes a positive obligation on the defence
lawyer to maintain silence and to refrain from helping the
prosecution in any manner. The limits of confidentiality restrict
solicitor-client privilege from applying to criminal acts or intentions,
or non-communications that pre-date the lawyer-client relationship.
The applicability of these limits to physical evidence was then
discussed. It was demonstrated that privilege does not apply to
inculpatory physical evidence, as per the judgment of Justice Gravely.
This finding posed a particular problem for Murray. Since the tapes
were not protected, he did not have any legal justification to suppress
them for use in the trial. Ultimately, although Murray was under the
impression that he was acting lawfully, his suppression of the tapes
was not protected by privilege and thus, was unlawful.
The importance of integrity to the criminal system was
discussed and it was shown that this requires that every accused
person be given an opportunity to defend herself at an impartial trial.
Relying on Seaboyer and Mills, it was shown that the accused is
entitled to full answer and defence to protect herself from criminal
conviction. To exercise this right, the accused must be able to inform
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her lawyer fully as to the facts of the case. Clients, it was suggested,
will not disclose all of the relevant facts unless there is absolute faith
that the information entrusted to the lawyer will remain strictly
confidential. Furthermore, developing a full defence may require
possession of physical evidence by the lawyer. Therefore, requiring
that evidence in the lawyer‟s possession be disclosed or turned over
has the potential to undermine the relationship between the defence
lawyer and her client. This has the practical effect of denying the
accused the opportunity to have all relevant information assessed by
the lawyer, raises serious questions, and threatens the integrity of the
criminal system.
Perceptions of a duty to disclose were then discussed and it
was shown that perhaps the biggest challenge facing Murray was
uncertainty surrounding whether or when there was a duty to
disclose evidence to the Crown. Some evidence, such as the oftmentioned smoking gun, clearly must be disclosed. With other
evidence, such as the tapes in the Bernardo case, the obligations are
much less clear. Some feel that there is rarely a duty to disclose, while
others feel that evidence cannot be suppressed under any
circumstances. Although there is no duty to aid in the investigation
against their client, Murray demonstrates that lawyers face confusion
about when physical evidence must be disclosed. Ultimately, it was
demonstrated that there is a need for the LSUC to provide a definitive
statement on physical evidence, and remove the need for lawyers to
have to rely upon the existing jurisprudence.
This paper then discussed the conflict between candor and
confidentiality, which caused major problems for Murray in his
defence of Bernardo. Murray had an unquestionable obligation to
loyalty and confidentiality, which suggested that the tapes should
have been suppressed for use at trial. Conversely, Murray also had a
duty to be candid with the court and to avoid obstructing justice,
which favoured disclosure of the tapes. Although Murray‟s decision to
suppress the tapes was later determined to be unlawful, it
demonstrates the difficult situation lawyers face when they take
possession of physical evidence. Moreover, the guidelines and advice
provided by the LSUC failed to provide clarity. Ultimately, without
guidance, lawyers trying to balance the duties of confidentiality and
candor are often left in a difficult position.
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When Murray was faced with his ethical dilemma
surrounding the tapes, guidance was essential. Unfortunately, this
guidance was almost entirely lacking. Guidance is essential if lawyers
are to maintain minimum standards of ethical practice. Without these
standards, the legal profession may lose the confidence of the public,
which is vital to self-regulation. The consensus among the legal
community was that there was an overwhelming lack of guidance for
Murray as he struggled with the tapes.
The Murray judgment helped to clarify some of the questions
arising when defence lawyers take possession of physical evidence.
Gravely J provided three legally justifiable options when defence
lawyers face the problem of physical evidence, mandating disclosure
and potential surrender of the evidence. As a result of the duty to
disclose the evidence, there is a corresponding duty to advise clients
that the lawyer‟s possession of the evidence may lead to it being
turned over to the Crown. As was discussed, this is likely to have the
practical effect of denying the accused the right to have their cases
fully interpreted by lawyers and may lead to the destruction of
evidence by the client. It was shown that other options, such as
returning the evidence after it has been viewed and possibly copied,
carry with them inherent problems. There was and is a need for a
definitive statement by the LSUC. However, due to the lack of
guidance, defence lawyers are well-served to avoid taking possession
of any inculpatory evidence.
Finally, the current Rules of Professional Conduct were
examined as they applied to the problems raised in the Murray case. It
was demonstrated that there is still an incredible void with respect to
rules relating to physical evidence. Lawyers are advised to disclose
“what ought to be disclosed,” despite a lack of clarity as to this
phrase‟s meaning. The rules relating to confidentiality, duty to clients,
and the duty to the administration of justice are clearer. Lawyers owe
an almost absolute duty of confidentiality to the information that is
obtained during the course of the lawyer-client relationship.
Similarly, there is a duty to resolutely and loyally represent the client,
within the confines of the law. Lawyers also have a duty to the
administration of justice, including treating the court with candor and
respect. These duties, however, are open to wide interpretations and
therefore, are of limited use when lawyers face tough ethical issues.
As was shown, it would not be unreasonable for Murray to have
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justified his defence of Bernardo under today‟s Rules. Therefore, to be
of real use to lawyers in times of ethical dilemmas, further
clarification is required.
Kenneth Murray faced an incredibly difficult dilemma in his
defence of Paul Bernardo. Murray interpreted his duties of loyalty and
confidentiality broadly, using them to justify the suppression of the
tapes for 17 months. As was accepted by Gravely J, it was Murray‟s
intention to use the tapes to undermine the credibility of Homolka as
a witness during Bernardo‟s trial. Due to the lack of clarity in the rules
respecting his duty to the administration of justice and disclosure, and
Murray‟s lack of research into his obligations as articulated in the
existing case law, Murray did not feel that the suppression of the tapes
was at odds with his obligations. Thus, in addition to having no
knowledge of Homolka‟s plea bargain, Murray did not have any
reason to turn the tapes over to the Crown. However, when the tapes
became known, he was widely criticized and faced both criminal and
professional sanctions. His case highlighted the need for significant
improvements in the guidelines given to lawyers facing similar
circumstances, as well as the need for lawyers to engage in thorough
case law research to assist them in clarifying their obligations. Despite
substantial debate and effort by the LSUC, no changes were made and
no guidance provided. Murray‟s case ultimately achieved very little.
Today, a lack of guidance remains and defence lawyers are left with
little help.
It is unfortunate that, despite the efforts of the LSUC and
Justice Gravely‟s decision, lawyers are still left without complete
guidance on how to handle physical evidence brought to them by a
client that is relevant to a criminal proceeding. Encouraging
disclosure is a simple answer that tips the scale of justice too far to the
side of the prosecution, ignoring the rights and privileges afforded to
an accused and her relationship with her counsel. In the end, much
more must be done to ensure that we as a society do not ignore the
value we place on our confidences or the trust we place in our legal
system. The rights of the accused and the desire to uphold the
administration of justice will always be in conflict. However, it is
wrong to assume that enough has been done to better the balance
between our individual rights and our societal goals.
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